The Faux Pas of Automatic Stay Under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1996 - The HCC Dictum, Two-Cherry Doctrine, and Beyond by Garimella, Sai Ramani & Mohanty, Gautam
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 
Volume 21 Issue 1 Article 7 
4-15-2021 
The Faux Pas of Automatic Stay Under the Indian Arbitration Act, 
1996 - The HCC Dictum, Two-Cherry Doctrine, and Beyond 
Sai Ramani Garimella 
Gautam Mohanty 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sai Ramani Garimella and Gautam Mohanty, The Faux Pas of Automatic Stay Under the Indian Arbitration 
Act, 1996 - The HCC Dictum, Two-Cherry Doctrine, and Beyond, 21 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 195 (2021) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol21/iss1/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Katrina.Gallardo@pepperdine.edu, 
anna.speth@pepperdine.edu, linhgavin.do@pepperdine.edu. 
[Vol. 21: 195, 2021]                                 The Faux Pas of Automatic Stay 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
 
 195 
THE FAUX PAS OF AUTOMATIC 
STAY UNDER THE INDIAN 
ARBITRATION ACT, 1996 - THE 
HCC DICTUM, TWO-CHERRY 
DOCTRINE, AND BEYOND 
Sai Ramani Garimella1 and Gautam Mohanty2 
 
ABSTRACT 
In the matter of Hindustan Construction. Co. v. 
Union of India, the Honorable Supreme Court of India 
(“SCI”) was presented with an opportunity to adjudicate 
upon a petition challenging the constitutional validity of 
Section 87 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 
(“1996 Act”) as inserted by Section 13 of the Arbitration and 
Conciliation (Amendment) Act of 2019 (“2019 Act").3  The 
legislative insertion stated that amendments made to the 
1996 Act by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 2015 
(“2015 Act”) would not apply to court proceedings arising 
out of, or in relation to, arbitral proceedings initiated before 
the commencement of the 2015 Act, i.e., October 23, 2015, 
 
1 Sai Ramani Garimella is an Assistant Professor and Faculty of Legal Studies 
at South Asian University, New Delhi and a Visiting Senior Research Associate 
at the Research Centre on Private International Law in Emerging Countries, 
University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa.  She can be reached 
at ramani@sau.ac.in.  
2 Gautam Mohanty is an advocate and also a Lecturer at Jindal Global Law 
School India (JGLS) and Co-Editor of The Arbitration Workshop.  He has 
previously worked as an Arbitration Associate with Arbitrator Justice Deepak 
Verma, Former Judge of Supreme Court of India.  He was also previously 
published in the Journal of International Arbitration (JOIA) in Vol. 36 Issue 6 
and in International Arbitration Law Review.  He has assisted various arbitral 
tribunals as a Tribunal Secretary in international and domestic arbitrations.  He 
can be reached at gautam.mohanty1414@gmail.com.  
3 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
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irrespective of whether such court proceedings were 
commenced prior or after the 2015 Act.4  As is so often the 
case with constitutional challenges, following an expansive 
and intricate analysis, the SCI, by its decision dated 
November 27, 2019, struck down Section 87 of the 1996 Act 
on grounds of it being contrary to the fundamental essence 
behind the implementation of the 1996 Act and violative of 
Article 14 of the 1950 Constitution of India (“1950 
Constitution”).5  Through this research, the authors attempt 
to analyze the possible ramifications of the aforesaid 
judgement against the backdrop of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
Model Law (“UNCITRAL Model Law”), Indian Arbitration 
law, and relevant applicable constitutional principles of 
India.6  The authors also attempt to expound upon the two-
cherry doctrine and its relevance in the context of Indian 
arbitral jurisprudence while juxtaposing it with the position 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law.7 
INTRODUCTION 
This research attempts an incisive analysis of a 
landmark decision in the arbitral jurisprudence of India 
rendered by the SCI that conclusively settled the debate 
concerning the applicability of the amended provisions of 
the 2015 Act to arbitration and court proceedings.  In 
Hindustan Construction Co. v. Union of India (“HCC”),8 the 
SCI, while opining that Section 87 of the 2019 Act reversed 
the beneficial effects of the 2015 Act,9 declared the 
 
4 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
5 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
6 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
7 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
8 AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
9 Section 87 was introduced after deleting Section 26 of the 2015 Act, which 
stipulated that the 2015 Act will not: 
apply to the arbitral proceedings commenced, in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 21 of the 
principal Act, before the commencement of this Act 
unless the parties otherwise agree but this Act shall apply 
2
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abovementioned statutory provision as contrary to the ethos 
of the statute and the progressive arbitral jurisprudence in 
India.  The rationale of the SCI, inter alia, was premised on: 
(i) Section 87 of the 1996 Act is in contravention to Article 
36(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law; (ii) the mischief 
caused by Section 87 of the 1996 Act resulting in “automatic 
stay” was against the aims and objectives of the 1996 Act; 
(iii) Section 87 of the 1996 Act underhandedly makes 
Section 35 of the 1996 Act otiose by questioning the finality 
of arbitral awards; and (iv) Section 87 of the 1996 Act is 
violative of Article 14 of the 1950 Constitution by depriving 
an award-holder from enjoying the benefits of a successful 
arbitration.10 
This research is set out as follows: Section I sets out 
the timeline leading to the Hindustan Construction Co. 
decision, including the position before and after the 
enactment of the 1996 Act and the 2015 Act.  Section II 
describes the two-cherry doctrine as postulated in the 
judgement vis-à-vis the 1996 Act.  Section III focuses on the 
constitutionality aspect of the judgement.  Section IV 
identifies the statutory avenues for the award-debtor and the 
award-creditor in presenting their respective applications for 
relief.  Section IV also attempts to map a methodology for 
the exercise of discretion by the Indian courts drawing 
guidance from international judicial practice.  
Notably, Hindustan Construction Co. addressed the 
constitutionality and scope of Section 36 of the 1996 Act 
entailing automatic suspension on the execution of the award 
following the existence of an application challenging the 
award per Section 34 of the 1996 Act.11  This issue was also 
previously considered by the SCI and the Gujarat High Court 
respectively in two separate judgements.  In National 
 
in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after 
the date of commencement of this Act. 
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, §26. 
10 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
11 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
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Aluminum Co. v. Pressteel & Fabrications Ltd., the SCI, 
while considering the scope of Section 36, observed that 
automatic stay defeated the objective of the 1996 Act.12  
However, the Court reserved its opinion on the matter and 
merely recommended the legislature consider an amendment 
to the aforesaid provision: 
11. However, we do notice that this 
automatic suspension of the execution of 
the award, the moment an application 
challenging the said award is filed under 
Section 34 of the Act leaving no discretion 
in the court to put the parties on terms, in 
our opinion, defeats the very objective of 
the alternate dispute resolution system to 
which arbitration belongs.  We do find that 
there is a recommendation made by the 
Ministry concerned to Parliament to amend 
Section 34 with a proposal to empower the 
civil court to pass suitable interim orders in 
such cases.  In view of the urgency of such 
amendment, we sincerely hope that 
necessary steps would be taken by the 
authorities concerned at the earliest to 
bring about the required change in law.13  
In Madhavpura Mercantile Co-op Bank Ltd. v. Shah 
Bimani Chemicals Private Ltd., Section 36 of the 1996 Act 
was unsuccessfully challenged for being beyond the statute’s 
 
12 Nat’l Aluminum Co. v. Pressteel & Fabrications Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 540 
(India); see also Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Port of Mumbai, (2014) 1 
ARBLR 512 (Bombay) and Radheshyam Shaw v. Union of India, AIR 2009 
(NOC) 309 (Calcutta).  While National Aluminum Co. (“NALCO”) discussed 
the powers of the Supreme Court to order under Section 42 of the 1996 Act, the 
Bombay High Court in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd., while deciding upon a 
Section 9 application for interim relief, observed that admission of a Section 34 
petition paralyzed the process for the winning party/award-creditor.  Afcons 
Infrastructure Ltd. v. Port of Mumbai, (2014) 1 ARBLR 512 (Bombay). 
13 Nat’l Aluminum Co. v. Pressteel & Fabrications Priv. Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 540 
(India). 
4
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol21/iss1/7
[Vol. 21: 195, 2021]                                 The Faux Pas of Automatic Stay 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
 
 199 
scope and objectives.14  The Gujarat High Court observed 
that the respondent failed to illustrate any inconsistency in 
the legislative competence of Parliament or in relation to any 
other provision of the 1950 Constitution after finding 
agreement with the legislative wisdom of allowing for 
enforcement of the arbitral award.15  It is also noteworthy 
that following the decision of the SCI in National Aluminum 
Co.,16 two judgements of the Calcutta High Court and Delhi 
High Court categorically mirrored the view of the SCI in 
calling for a radical revamp of the provisions of the 1996 
Act.17  The Calcutta High Court in Sarkar & Sarkar v. State 
of West Bengal observed that the exercise, prima facie, of the 
right to appeal available to the unsuccessful litigant under 
Section 37 of Act, 1996 does not operate as an automatic stay 
on the execution, and that such order be obtained by the 
unsuccessful litigant before the court.18  The Delhi High 
Court’s observation in Décor India Private Ltd. v. National 
Building Construction Corp.,19 seemingly a precursor to 
Hindustan Construction Co., echoed a similar opinion:   
15. Now if the execution of the Decree 
followed by [the] Award is to be delayed 
by treating the pendency of Appeal as 
automatic stay then the new legislation i.e., 
the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996[,] 
instead of being an efficient and speedy 
 
14 Madhavpura Mercantile Co-op Bank Ltd. v. Shah Bimani Chems. Priv. Ltd., 
(2009) 2 ARBLR 287, 291 (Gujarat); Nat’l Bldg. Constr. Corp. v. Lloyds 
Insulation India Ltd., (2005) (Supp) ARBLR 563 (India). 
15 Madhavpura Mercantile Co-op Bank Ltd. v. Shah Bimani Chemicals Priv. 
Ltd., (2009) 2 ARBLR 287, 291 (Gujarat). 
16 Nat’l Aluminum Co. v. Pressteel & Fabrications Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 540 
(India). 
17 Sarkar & Sarkar v. State of W. Bengal, (2006) 4 ARBLR 379 (India); Décor 
India Priv. Ltd. v. Nat’l Bldg. Constr., (2007) 3 ARBLR 348 (India). 
18 Sarkar & Sarkar v. State of W. Bengal (2006), 4 ARBLR 379 (India) 
(emphasis added). 
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remedy[,] would be reduced to a remedy 
worse than what we already had, that is the 
civil suits and the deep routed procedural 
delays till passing of the decree and even 
thereafter. [ ] [W]e may hasten to add that 
even in civil suits' decrees[,] there is no 
automatic stay on pendency of the 
Appeal[.]  [S]tay[—]even if granted in 
execution of civil suits' decrees[—] is more 
often than not . . . conditional [ ] and 
preferably subject to deposit of the decretal 
amount.  Had the legislature intended to 
give the provision of stay of execution on 
filing of an Appeal under Section 37 of the 
Act, it would have given the provision in 
the Act itself, in pari materia with Order 
XLI Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
Since it has not been done by the 
legislature, in our view, it will not be 
possible to provide unconditional 
automatic stay under the principle of 
merger.  So[,] from whatever angle we 
examine this proposition, the 
interpretation, in our view, falls in favour 
of non-automatic stay.20  
In the backdrop of the aforesaid judgments, this 
research attempts to analyze the Hindustan Construction Co. 
decision and its impact on the enforceability of arbitral 
awards in India.   
I – ARBITRATION – THROUGH THE ANNALS OF 
THE LAW 
This research is premised upon an assertion that the 
arbitration law in India has, despite the stated legislative 
purpose to the contrary, envisaged an extensive role for the 
 
20 Décor India Priv. Ltd. v. Nat’l Bldg. Constr. Corp., (2007) 3 ARBLR 348 
(India); Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
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courts often coupled with discretion, and this feature is 
evident in the legislative provisions and their 
interpretation.21 Towards establishing this assertion, the 
research within this part attempts to map the arbitration law, 
including its historical antecedents, to trace the role of the 
courts throughout the lifecycle of the arbitration and at the 
time of challenges under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, 
especially in determinations related to the time and nature of 
the challenges.  
The earliest known law on the regulation of 
arbitration in colonial India was the Bengal Regulation of 
1772.22  The Indian Arbitration Act of 1899—modelled on 
the English Arbitration Law—followed and applied within 
the Presidency towns of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta.23  In 
1908, the Civil Procedure Code was revised to include 
provisions related to arbitration.24  In 1937, the Arbitration 
(Protocol and Convention) Act of 1937 (“1937 Act”) was 
enacted to give effect to the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration 
Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the 
 
21 The legislation has identified the role of the courts in India, rather 
expansively, in the following aspects: Reference to arbitration (S.8, 45 &54); 
Appointment of arbitration (S.11); Interim measures (S.9); Challenge to 
arbitrators (S.12, 13 & 14); Challenging the arbitration awards (S.34); Seeking 
Courts assistance with regard to Witnesses (S.27); Contempt Proceedings 
(S.27); Enforcement of awards (S.36, 49&58); and Appealable orders (S.37 and 
S.59). In P. Anand Gajapati Raju v. P.V.G. Raju, (2000) 4 SCC 539 (India)  at 
541 the SCI held that the 1996 legislation envisaged minimal judicial 
intervention in the tribunal’s proceedings. The Court referred to Section 5 of 
the legislation - Extent of judicial intervention: "Notwithstanding anything 
contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by 
this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except so provided in this Part". 
22 Ben Steinbruck, International Arbitration in India, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK 448, (Stephan Balthasar ed., 
2016); Xinyi Shen, India Moves One Step Further Towards “Arbitration-
friendly” Jurisdiction, 11 ARB. L. REV. 266, 267 (2019); Amelia C. Rendeiro, 
Indian Arbitration and “Public Policy”, 89 TEX. L. REV. 699, 701 (2011). 
23 Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 449. 
24 Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448 
7
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Execution of Foreign Awards of 1927.25  A comprehensive 
arbitration law was enacted in 1940, and it substantially 
allowed judicial intervention in the arbitral process.26  The 
Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act of 1961 
implemented India’s commitment to the 1958 United 
Nations New York Convention on Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“NYC”).27  Thus, 
the law and practice of arbitration was governed by the 
Indian Arbitration Act of 1940 (“1940 Act”) and the Foreign 
Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act of 1961 (“1961 
Act”) which replaced the 1937 Act.28 
 The 1940 Act allowed multiple opportunities for 
litigants to approach the court for intervention during the 
lifecycle of the arbitration and after, thus compounding 
delays and thereby rendering arbitrations inefficient and 
unattractive.29  Courts could be approached to set the 
arbitration proceedings in motion.30  The existence of an 
agreement and a dispute was required to be proved in court.31  
Pending arbitral proceedings, courts could be approached for 
an extension of time for making an award.32  Finally, awards 
could be enforced only after the courts converted them into 
a ruling of their own.33  This has been a singular concern 
regarding the enforcement of arbitral awards in India, and its 
impact on the arbitration law has sustained despite the 
 
25 A. F. M. Maniruzzama & Ijaz Ali Chishti, International Arbitration and 
Public Policy Issues in the Indian Subcontinent: A Look Through the English 
Common Law and International Lenses, MANCHESTER J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 
(forthcoming). 
26 Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448. 
27 Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448. 
28 Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448. 
29 Aloke Ray & Dipen Sabharwal, Indian Arbitration at a Crossroads, WHITE 
& CASE 1, 1 (2007), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/537e8bcbe4b09ac6c31f0ae6/t/53daf516
e4b0e65009ffa151/1406858518409/LM_Arbitration+in+India.pdf. 
30 Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448. 
31 Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448. 
32 Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448. 
33 Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448. 
8
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enactment of a new arbitration law, based upon the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and much harmonization with the 
best practices in this domain.34  As will be discussed in the 
foregoing narrative, the role of the courts has placed a 
question on the enforceability of the award, despite the law 
itself proclaiming that the award ought to be considered at 
par with the decree of the court.  The 1940 Act dealt with 
only domestic arbitration,35 however, there were instances 
that the law continued to be applied to foreign arbitral 
awards as well: a) an award resulting in an arbitration 
agreement between parties one of whom is not a 
citizen/corporate of India may provide for an arbitration in 
India to be governed by the 1940 Act;36 and b) an award 
resulting from a reference to arbitration in a dispute 
involving a foreign element could still be decided as per the 
1940 Act as reference to arbitration by the trial court was 
based on the said legislation and its validity was not open to 
any objections.37  These decisions exemplified the enhanced 
role of the courts in arbitration—domestic and 
international—envisaged within the Indian law prior to 
1996.   
 India ratified the NYC on July 13, 1960, albeit with 
the reservation on reciprocity.38  It is interesting to note that 
early disputes regarding enforcement in India of U.S.-seated 
arbitral awards were decided under common law,39 and not 
under the NYC as the United States did not accede to the 
NYC until 1971.40  The SCI held awards non-enforceable 
 
34 Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448. 
35 Harpreet Kaur, The 1996 Arbitration and Conciliation Act: A Step Toward 
Improving Arbitration in India, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 261, 262 (2010). 
36 Michel Golodetz v. Serajuddin & Co., AIR 1959 Cal 603 (India); W. Woods 
& Son Ltd. v. Bengal Corp., AIR. 1959 Cal 8 (India).  The following provisions 
of the legislation are applicable: The Arbitration Act, 1940, §§ 14, 17, 31, 32. 
37 Nachiappa Chettiar v. Subramaniam Chettiar, AIR 1960 SC 307 (India). 
38 Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448. 
39 Badat & Co. v. E. India Trading Co., AIR 1964 SC 538 (India). 
40 The United States became the thirty-seventh Contracting State through 
accession on September 30th, 1970.  
9
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except as judgments rendered upon the award.41  It opined, 
“[i]f the law of the country in which it was made gives 
finality to judgment based upon an award and not to the 
award itself, the award can furnish no cause of action for a 
suit in India.”42  
 The 1940 Act also envisaged a significant role for 
the courts with regard to decisions on challenges to arbitral 
awards—they could be set aside for being “improperly 
procured . . .  or otherwise invalid”—allowing, therefore, an 
interpretational role for the courts including an opportunity 
to inquire into the merits of the award43 and extensively 
articulated provisions on the jurisdiction of the courts.44  
 
41 Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448. 
42 Badat & Co. v. E. India Trading Co., AIR 1964 SC 538, 558 (India). 
43 The Arbitration Act, 1940, §30.   
Grounds for setting aside award.  An award shall not be 
set aside except on one or more of the following grounds, 
namely:-  
(a) that an arbitrator or umpire has 
misconducted himself or the proceedings; 
(b) that an award has been made after the 
issue of an order by the Court superseding the 
arbitration or after arbitration proceedings 
have become invalid under section 35; 
(c) that an award has been improperly 
procured or is otherwise invalid.  
The Arbitration Act, 1940, §30.   
44 The Arbitration Act, 1940, §31.   
Jurisdiction.  
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, an award may 
be filed in any Court having jurisdiction in the matter to 
which the reference relates.   
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law 
for the time being in force and save as otherwise 
provided in this Act, all questions regarding the validity, 
effect or existence of an award or an arbitration 
agreement between the parties to the agreement or 
persons claiming under them shall be decided by the 
Court in which the award under the agreement has been, 
or may be, filed, and by no other Court.   
(3) All applications regarding the conduct of arbitration 
proceedings or otherwise arising out of such proceedings 
10
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 The 1996 Act,45 guided by the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, specifically aimed for speedy and efficacious dispute 
resolution mechanisms regarding arbitration and 
enforcement of arbitral awards.46  Towards this, the law 
addressed the concern against the intervention of courts and 
set on the path of course correction.47  Courts continued to 
have a role in facilitating arbitration, but importantly, under 
the 1996 Act, the arbitral award is now treated as a decree, 
and enforceable as such, unlike the 1940 Act that required 
an arbitral award to be decreed by the court as final and 
binding.48 
 Part I of the 1996 Act enlisted a few provisions 
identifying the role of the court in the context of arbitration 
before commencement of the arbitration proceedings.49  
Under Section 8, a party to an arbitration agreement or 
anyone claiming through such party can apply to the courts 
to refer the parties to arbitration unless the court finds that 
no valid prima facie arbitration agreement exists.50  The SCI 
 
shall be made to the Court where the award has been, or 
may be, filed, and to no other Court.   
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in 
this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, 
where in any reference any application under this Act has 
been made in a Court competent to entertain it, that Court 
alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration 
proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out 
of that Court and in no other Court. 
The Arbitration Act, 1940, §31.   
45 The 1996 Act applied to domestic and international arbitration.  The 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 
46 Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448. 
47 Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448. 
48 Steinbruck, supra note 22, at 448. 
49 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 
50 Note that this section is significantly different from Section 34 of the 1940 
Act that prescribed the following twin conditions for reference to arbitration be 
satisfied: (i) that there is sufficient reason for referring the matter to arbitration 
in accordance with the arbitration agreement; and (ii) that the applicant was, at 
the time when the proceedings were commenced, and still continues to be, ready 
and willing to do all things necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration. 
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34. 
11
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has consistently held that the language of Section 8 
is peremptory and it is obligatory for the courts to refer the 
parties to arbitration by the terms of their arbitration 
agreement,51 unlike the 1940 Act, wherein courts exercised 
discretionary powers in this regard.52  In India Household 
and Healthcare Ltd. v. LG Household and Healthcare Ltd., 
the SCI emphasized the presumptive validity of an 
arbitration clause and held that the courts ought to construe 
the arbitration agreement in favor of upholding the same.53  
In Hindustan Petroleum Corp. v. Pinkcity Midway 
Petroleums, the SCI,  articulating upon the civil court’s role, 
observed that an objection on the applicability of the 
arbitration clause to the dispute should be heard only by the 
Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 of the 1996 Act and the 
civil court shall not examine the issue through a Section 8 
application.54   
 In relation to arbitration proceedings, parties can 
approach the court only: (a) for any interim measure of 
protection or injunction or any appointment of receiver 
etc.,55 and (b) for the appointment of an arbitrator in the 
event a party fails to appoint an arbitrator or such party-
appointed arbitrators fail to agree upon the choice of a 
chairperson for the tribunal.  While handling such requests 
for appointment, courts shall confine their examination of 
 
51 P. Anand Gajapati Raju v. P.V.G. Raju, (2000) 4 SCC 539 (India); Konkan 
Ry. Corp. v. Rani Constr. Priv. Ltd., (2002) 2 SCC 388 (India); Smt. Kalpana 
Kothari v. Smt. Sudha Yadav & Orgs., (2002) 1 SCC 203 (India); Sukanya 
Holdings Priv. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya & Anr. (2003) 5 SCC 531 (India); 
Magma Leasing & Fin. Ltd. & Anr. v. Potluri Madhavilata & Anr. (2009) 10 
SCC 103 (India). 
52 The Arbitration Act, 1940. 
53 India Household & Healthcare Ltd. v. LG Household & Healthcare Ltd., 
(2007) 5 SCC 510 (India). 
54 Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums, (2003) 6 
SCC 503 (India). 
55 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §11, as amended by The 
Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015—applications for the 
same shall be moved before the commercial division in the High Courts, as per 
Section 10(3) of the Commercial Courts Act of 2015. 
12
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol21/iss1/7
[Vol. 21: 195, 2021]                                 The Faux Pas of Automatic Stay 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
 
 207 
the existence of the arbitration agreement to the pre-
reference stage.56 
 Further, Section 27 of the 1996 Act specifies that 
the arbitral tribunal or a party with the approval of the 
tribunal may apply to the court seeking its assistance in 
taking evidence.57  However, the Indian law, unlike the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, also provides for penalties for 
failure to comply with the processes so issued as if they were 
orders issued in suits before the courts.58  Courts may either 
appoint a commissioner for taking evidence or order that the 
evidence be provided directly to the arbitral tribunal.59 
AWARDS – ENFORCEMENT AND SETTING ASIDE 
APPLICATIONS 
Similar to Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, Section 34 of the 1996 Act specified that designated 
courts may be approached for applying to set aside arbitral 
awards.60  However, the Indian law provided for an 
enhanced role of the courts by tweaking the content that 
could be ascribed to a public policy exception with local 
 
56 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §11(6A); The Arbitration and 
Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015; Acts of Parliament, 2016 (India); see 
Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Ltd. v. Northern Coal Field Ltd., 
(2019) 6 L.R. 237 (India); WAPCOS Ltd. v. Salma Dam Joint Venture & 
Another, (2019) 6 L.R. 247 (India); Union of India v. BM Constr. Co., (2019) 
6 L.R. 284 (India). 
57 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §27(5). 
58 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §27(5). 
59 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §§27(3) & (6). 
60 See The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34.   
[I]n the case of an arbitration other than international 
commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of 
original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High 
Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil 
jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions 
forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same 
had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include 
any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil 
Court, or any Court of Small Causes[.]   
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §2(1)(e).  
13
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flavor.61  The Law Commission of India expressed disfavor 
with judicial intervention through expansive content to 
public policy exception, lamenting that courts could at their 
discretion pursue enhanced scrutiny of the awards.62 
Awards become executable and enforceable after 
three months of their receipt,63 by when the time to challenge 
them as per Section 34 (1) expires.64  An award-holder 
would have to wait for a period of three months following 
receipt of the award, and were a Section 34 challenge 
application filed by the award-debtor, until it has been 
resolved.65  Thus, a bona fide award-holder was prevented 
 
61 See The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.  Interestingly, the earliest 
understanding on public policy in arbitration was founded upon a narrow 
construction of the curial role of the courts in Renusagar Power Co. v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., AIR 1994 SC 860 (1993) (India).  However, later jurisprudence 
following the enactment of the 1996 Act saw the courts adopting an expansive 
content to this exception; see ONGC v. Saw Pipes (2003), 5 SCC 705 (India); 
NPCC v. Rajdhani Builders, (2006) (2) ARBLR 219 (Delhi); McDermott Int’l 
Inc. v. Burn Standard Co., (2006) 11 SCC 181 (India) (citing with approval 
from State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata, (2005) 12 SCC 77 (India)); see 
generally Fali Nariman, Ten Steps to Salvage Arbitration in India: The First 
LGIA-India Arbitration Lecture, 27(2) ARB. INT’L 115 (2011); Daniel Mathew, 
Situating Public Policy in the Indian Arbitration Paradigm: Pursuing the 
Elusive Balance 3(1) J. OF NAT’L L. UNIV. 105 (2015); JUSTICE R.S. 
BACHAWAT, LAW OF ARBITRATION & CONCILIATION, 1 (6th ed. 2017). 
62 LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, REPORT NO. 246 AMENDMENTS TO THE 
ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT 1996 (2014); LAW COMMISSION OF 
INDIA, SUPPLEMENTARY TO REPORT NO. 246 TO ARBITRATION AND 
CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 (2015).  
63 Courts retain the power to extend this period by another 30 days upon 
satisfaction of the reasons for delay.  The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 
1996, §34(3).  
64 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34(3). 
65 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34.   
Application for setting aside arbitral award— 
(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be 
made only by an application for setting aside such award 
in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). 
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only 
if— 
(a) the party making the application furnishes 
proof that— 
14
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(i) a party was under some 
incapacity, or 
(ii) the arbitration agreement is 
not valid under the law to which 
the parties have subjected it or, 
failing any indication thereon, 
under the law for the time being in 
force; or 
(iii) the party making the 
application was not given proper 
notice of the appointment of an 
arbitrator or of the arbitral 
proceedings or was otherwise 
unable to present his case; or 
(iv) the arbitral award deals with 
a dispute not contemplated by or 
not falling within the terms of the 
submission to arbitration, or it 
contains decisions on matters 
beyond the scope of the 
submission to arbitration: 
Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to 
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, 
only that part of the arbitral award which contains 
decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be 
set aside; or 
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or 
the arbitral procedure was not in accordance 
with the agreement of the parties, unless such 
agreement was in conflict with a provision of 
this Part from which the parties cannot 
derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not 
in accordance with this Part; or 
(b) the Court finds that— 
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not 
capable of settlement by arbitration under the 
law for the time being in force, or 
(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the 
public policy of India. 
Explanation 1.—For the avoidance of any doubt, it is 
clarified that an award is in conflict with the public 
policy of India, only if,—  
(i) the making of the award was induced or 
affected by fraud or corruption or was in 
violation of section 75 or section 81; or  
(ii) it is in contravention with the 
fundamental policy of Indian law; or 
15
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from reaping the fruits of the arbitral award because of 
an "automatic stay" on proceedings for execution of the 
 
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic 
notions of morality or justice. [(inserted by 
2015 Amendment Act)] 
Explanation 2—For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to 
whether there is a contravention with the fundamental 
policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the 
merits of the dispute. [(inserted by 2015 Amendment 
Act)]  
(2A) An arbitral award arising out of 
arbitrations other than international 
commercial arbitrations, may also be set 
aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the 
award is vitiated by patent illegality 
appearing on the face of the award: Provided 
that an award shall not be set aside merely on 
the ground of an erroneous application of the 
law or by reappreciation of evidence. 
[(inserted by 2015 Amendment Act)] 
(3) An application for setting aside may not 
be made after three months have elapsed 
from the date on which the party making that 
application had received the arbitral award 
or, if a request had been made under section 
33, from the date on which that request had 
been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:  
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the 
applicant was prevented by sufficient cause 
from making the application within the said 
period of three months it may entertain the 
application within a further period of thirty 
days, but not thereafter. 
(4) On receipt of an application under sub-
section (1), the Court may, where it is 
appropriate and it is so requested by a party, 
adjourn the proceedings for a period of time 
determined by it in order to give the arbitral 
tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral 
proceedings or to take such other action as in 
the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate 
the grounds for setting aside the arbitral 
award.   
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34.   
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award on account of the losing party filing a setting aside 
application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.66 
Section 36 of the amended 2015 Act addresses the 
impact of Section 34 on the enforceability of the award; the 
party challenging an award shall apply separately for stay on 
execution.67  Courts—as per the amended Section 36(2) and 
(3)—shall exercise discretion to order a stay of execution 
and prescribe the conditions for its operation.68  Section 26 
of the 2015 Act expressly provides that the Act would apply 
to arbitral proceedings which commence on or after the date 
of commencement of the 2015 Amendment; i.e., October 23, 
2015 ("Cut-Off Date").69  An automatic stay remained 
operative on the enforcement of all arbitral awards in cases 
 
66 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34.   
67 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36.   
(1) Where the time for making an application to set aside 
the arbitral award under section 34 has expired, then, 
subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), such award 
shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the same manner 
as if it were a decree of the court.  
(2) Where an application to set aside the arbitral award 
has been filed in the Court under section 34, the filing of 
such an application shall not by itself render that award 
unenforceable, unless the Court grants an order of stay 
of the operation of the said arbitral award in accordance 
with the provisions of sub-section (3), on a separate 
application made for that purpose.  
(3) Upon filing of an application under sub-section (2) 
for stay of the operation of the arbitral award, the Court 
may, subject to such conditions as it may deem fit, grant 
stay of the operation of such award for reasons to be 
recorded in writing: 
Provided that the Court shall, while considering the 
application for grant of stay in the case of an arbitral 
award for payment of money, have due regard to the 
provisions for grant of stay of a money decree under the 
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36.   
68 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36(2–3). 
69 The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, §26. 
17
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where a petition under Section 34 of the 2015 Act was 
pending as of the Cut-Off Date.70 
Pertinently, the issue of retrospective application of 
the 2015 amendment was discussed within the Justice 
Srikrishna Committee’s Report.71  Applauding the 
amendment for ushering changes that minimize judicial 
intervention in the arbitral process through, among others, 
an amendment to Section 36, the Report observed that 
removal of automatic stay of the award helps prevent parties 
from engaging in dilatory tactics through unnecessary 
involvement of the courts.72  However, it was aware of the 
detrimental impact that the continued confusion regarding 
the retrospective applicability the amended 2015 Act could 
foster.73  It recommended that the applicability of Section 26 
of the 2015 Act be limited to arbitrations commenced on or 
after the Cut-Off Date and related court proceedings.74 
On at least two occasions, higher judiciary in India 
has attempted to articulate on the applicability of Section 26 
of the 2015 Act.75  In Ardee Infrastructure v. Anuradha 
Bhatia, the Delhi High Court held Section 26 is applicable 
only to those arbitral proceedings which were initiated after 
the commencement of the amendment and to court 
proceedings arising out of them.76  The Court reasoned that 
the right to have an award enforced included the negative 
 
70 Khaitan & Co, Arbitral Awards- Automatic Stays, On? And Casus Omissus 
for IBC, LEXOLOGY (December 24, 2019), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=64bce580-f3ee-4df5-9806-
2b8106952f52. 
71 See JUSTICE B.N. SRIKRISHNA, REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE TO 
REVIEW THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF ARBITRATION MECHANISM IN INDIA, 
(2017).  
72 SRIKRISHNA, supra note 71, at 21.  
73 SRIKRISHNA, supra note 71, at 23. 
74 SRIKRISHNA, supra note 71, at 61–62. 
75 See Ardee Infrastructure Priv. Ltd. v. Anuradha Bhatia, 2017 (2) ARBLR 163 
(Delhi); Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd. v. Board of Control for Cricket in India, 2017 
(2) Bom CR 113 (India). 
76 Ardee Infrastructure Priv. Ltd. v. Anuradha Bhatia, 2017 (2) ArbLR 163 
(Delhi). 
18
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right to not have it enforced until challenges or objections to 
the same were disposed.77  Section 34 of the 1996 Act thus 
created a vested right for automatic stay of the award for 
parties to an arbitral proceeding which commenced before 
the 2015 Act pending a decision on challenge to the award.78  
The Bombay High Court differed though.79  In Kochi Cricket 
Private Ltd. vs. Board of Control for Cricket in India,80 a 
challenge to the award was filed before the commencement 
of the 2015 Act but the execution application for the award 
was filed after the commencement of the 2015 Act.81  The 
appellants challenged the execution application by applying 
the un-amended Section 36 to the facts and pleaded for an 
automatic stay on the award.82  However, the Single Judge 
ruled that the amended Section 36 would apply, thus there 
would be no automatic stay, and ordered execution.83 
The SCI addressed the question of interpretation of 
Section 26 of the 2015 Act and its applicability to the 
proceedings pending prior to such amendment in Board of 
Control for Cricket in India vs. Kochi Cricket Private Ltd. 
(“BCCI”), a set of appeals that included an appeal from the 
abovementioned Bombay High Court decision.84  
Characterising Section 36 of the 1996 Act as a procedural 
 
77 Ardee Infrastructure Priv. Ltd. v. Anuradha Bhatia, 2017 (2) ArbLR 163 
(Delhi). 
78 See Muskan Arora, Indian Supreme Court Strikes Down Automatic Stay 
Provisions for Good, WOLTERS KLUWER (February 15, 2020), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/02/15/indian-supreme-
court-strikes-down-automatic-stay-provisions-for-good/. 
79 Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd. v. Bd. of Control for Cricket in India, 2017 (2) 
BomCR 113 (India). 
80 Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd. v. Bd. of Control for Cricket in India, 2017 (2) BomCR 
113 (India). 
81 Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd. v. Bd. of Control for Cricket in India, 2017 (2) 
BomCR 113 (India). 
82 Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd. v. Bd. of Control for Cricket in India, 2017 (2) 
BomCR 113 (India). 
83 Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd. v. Bd. of Control for Cricket in India, 2017 (2) 
BomCR 113 (India). 
84 Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 
1549 (India). 
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provision, the Court held that an award-debtor cannot enjoy 
the substantive vested right of an automatic stay on the 
execution of an arbitral award upon filing a setting aside 
petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.85  The Supreme 
Court also observed that the phrase "has been" in subsection 
two of Section 36 referred to petitions filed under Section 34 
of the 1996 Act before the Cut-Off Date.86  The Court further 
clarified that the substituted Section 36 would apply to 
arbitral awards in cases where a petition under Section 34 of 
the 1996 Act has already been filed as of the Cut-Off Date.87 
The 1996 Act was further amended in 2019 to 
regulate its application based upon the timeline of the 
arbitral proceedings and the proceedings in the court based 
upon the arbitration.88  Section 87, inserted through the 2019 
Act, provided that the 2015 amendment applied only to the 
arbitral proceedings that commenced on or after the Cut-Off 
Date and to such court proceedings that emanate from such 
arbitral proceedings.89  Moreover, Section 15 of the 2019 
Act deleted Section 26 of the 2015 Act.90  The insertion thus 
 
85 Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 
1549 (India).  
86 Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 
1549 (India). 
87 Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 
1549 (India). 
88 See Subhiksh Vasudev, The 2019 amendment to the Indian Arbitration Act: 
A classic case of one step forward two steps backward?, WOLTERS KLUWER 




89 Shaneen Parikh & Shalaka Patil, The Saga Continues in 2019- Applicability 
of the 2015 Amendments in light of the 2019 Amendments., CYRIL AMARCHAND 
MANGALDAS (August 28, 2019), 
https://corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2019/08/applicability-of-the-2015-
amendments-2019-amendments-arbitration-conciliation/. 
90 Padmaja Kaul & Yugank Goel, Aman Chaudhary, India: The Supreme Court 
Strikes Down Section 87 Of The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 – 
Reinstates BCCI v. Kochi Cricket, MONDAQ (December 11, 2019), 
https://www.mondaq.com/india/trials-appeals-compensation/873536/the-
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resulted in nullifying the impact of the Supreme Court's 
decision in BCCI by restoring the pre-2015 amendment 
position: automatic stay on execution of awards for set-aside 
applications filed under Section 34 before the Cut-Off 
Date.91  The following section discusses the delineation of 
the SCI in the HCC dictum wherein it addressed the 
constitutionality-related challenges to Section 87 of the 2019 
Act and the status of the stay vis-à-vis the arbitral award.92  
II. THE TWO-CHERRY DOCTRINE VIS-À-VIS THE 
INDIAN ARBITRATION ACT, 1996: 
One of the crucial aspects of the HCC judgment, in 
the view of the authors, was the discussion revolving around 
the two-cherry doctrine wherein the SCI engaged in an 
incisive comparative analysis of the enforcement procedure 
and finality of arbitral awards.93  The enforcement procedure 
relating to domestic awards under the 1996 Act, unlike the 
1940 Act, enunciates that an arbitral award shall be enforced 
under the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 (“1908 CPC”) in the 
same manner as if it were a decree of the Court.94  Further, 
in Section 36 of the 1996 Act, unlike in the 1940 Act, an 
obligation is cast upon the enforcing party to satisfy the court 




91 Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 
1549 (India).  
92 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
93 See Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
94 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36.   
Where the time for making an application to set aside the 
arbitral award under section 34 has expired, or such 
application having been made, it has been refused, the 
award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil 
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in the same manner as if it 
were a decree of the Court.   
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36.  Also, for a 
comparative understanding of section 36 as per the 2015 
amendment, see Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket 
Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 1549 (India). 
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the same satisfies other legal requirements such as 
registration, impleading of necessary parties, etcetera.95 
The SCI observed that Articles 34 and 3596 of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law postulated for two bites at the 
cherry: (i) during setting aside applications,97 and (ii) during 
recognition and enforcement applications.98  In comparison, 
as per the SCI, Section 35 and Section 36 of the 1996 Act do 
not follow the two-cherry doctrine.99  When an award is 
made in India, it automatically becomes final and binding as 
a decree under the 1908 CPC, thereby rendering no recourse 
when it comes to recognition and enforcement.100  The court 
explained that such deviation was necessary to ensure that 
when the time limit for making an application elapses or 
such an application is rejected, the award shall be enforced 
 
95 Diddi Kumaraswamy v. Pathakala Bhaskar, (2008) 2 ArbLR 573.  In the 
instant case the existence of an arbitration agreement was not evidenced; the 
award which was dealing with transfer of immovable property was not on 
stamped paper.  
96 UNCITRAL MODEL L. ON INT’L ARB. ARTICLE 35 (UNITED NATIONS 1985). 
(1) An arbitral award, irrespective of the country in 
which it was made, shall be recognized as binding and, 
upon application in writing to the competent court, shall 
be enforced subject to the provisions of this article and 
of Article 36. 
(2) The party relying on an award or applying for its 
enforcement shall supply the duly authenticated original 
award or a duly certified copy thereof, and the original 
arbitration agreement referred to in Article 7 or a duly 
certified copy thereof.  If the award or agreement is not 
made in an official language of this State, the party shall 
supply a duly certified translation thereof into such 
language. 
UNCITRAL MODEL L. ON INT’L ARB. ARTICLE 35 (UNITED NATIONS 1985). 
97 One of the grounds for refusal to recognize foreign awards is when the award 
is not binding. 
98 Hindustan Construction Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
99 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §35.  “Subject to this Part an 
arbitral award shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming 
under them respectively.”  The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §35.   
100 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, §33; The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 
1996, §9. 
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under the 1908 CPC as if it were a decree of the court.101  
The authors agree with the SCI in its observation that the 
1996 Act has not followed the framework stipulated in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.102  Section 36 of the 1996 Act 
provides for a more robust enforcement regime similar to the 
German ZPO103 and Japanese Arbitration Law.104   
A perusal of the travaux préparatories of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law pertaining to the term “binding”105 
indicates that the Secretariat suggested two proposals viz.: 
(i) introduction of the term “between the parties” to signify 
that the award cannot bind other persons;106 and (ii) 
specifying the exact point in time when an award shall be 
recognized as binding.107  However, the Working Group 
declined to heed to the abovementioned suggestions on 
grounds that “there was no need for express statements” on 
these points.108  Subsequently, the Secretariat, in its 
 
101 Hindustan Construction Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
102 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 
103 Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], § 1055.  Section 1055 
of the German ZPO states that the arbitral award has the same effect between 
the parties as a final and binding court judgment.  Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] 
[Code of Civil Procedure], § 1055; see also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1113–87 (2d ed. 2014). 
104 [Arbitration Law], Law No. 138 of 2003, art. 45, para. 1 (Japan).  Article 
45(1) of the Japanese Arbitration Law states that “[a]n arbitral award 
(irrespective of whether or not the place of arbitration is in the territory of Japan 
. . . ) shall have the same effect as a final and conclusive judgment.”  See also 
BORN, supra note 103. 
105 Report of the Working Group on International Contract Practices on the 
Work of its Seventh Session, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 17, at 36, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/246 (1984).  Pursuant to much discussion and a proposal by the Soviet 
Union, it was decided that for foreign awards, the point in time when the award 
becomes binding is governed by the law under which the award was made. 
106 HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY 1006–52 (1st ed. 1989).   
107 HOLTZMANN & NEHAUS, supra note 106; see also Studies and Reports on 
Specific Subjects, [1983] 14 Y.B. Int’l Trade L. 92, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.42 (“not yet . . . binding” in Article V(1)(e) of the NYC is 
commonly interpreted as meaning “still open to ordinary means of recourse”). 
108 U.N. GAOR, supra note 105, at 36.   
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commentary on the Working Group’s draft, interpreted the 
above term to connote that even though not expressly stated, 
an award is binding between the parties and from the date of 
the award.109  Pertinently, a subtle difference highlighted 
when comparing Article 35 of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
and the NYC, according to the authors, is the useful 
distinction drawn between enforcement and recognition.110  
Even though the essence of Article 35 was modelled on the 
parallel requirements of the NYC, sub-clause one of Article 
35 makes it clear that recognition may occur independently 
of enforcement and it is only for the purposes of enforcing 
an award that a separate application may be made.111   
Further, the Working Group explained that 
recognition was an abstract legal effect which could be 
obtained automatically without necessarily being requested 
by a party.112  The authors are of the opinion that domestic 
arbitral legislations commonly provide that the award 
obtains its executory force by an “exequatur,”113 although 
the procedure may vary from one state to the other.  From a 
comparative standpoint, in international practice, if an 
arbitral award is not vacated, the award creditor will seek 
enforcement of the award which will probably involve 
commencing legal proceedings under local laws of the state 
where the award is sought to be enforced.114  Often, 
however, an award must be “confirmed” by a local court in 
 
 
109 Analytical Commentary on the Draft Text of a Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 18, at 76, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/264, (1985). 
110 U.N. GAOR, supra note 108. 
111 U.N. GAOR, supra note 105, at 35. 
112 U.N. GAOR, supra note 105, at 35. 
113 “Exequatur” refers to court-granted leave to enforce an arbitral award.  
“Double-exequatur” refers to the procedure whereby leave to enforce an arbitral 
award might have to be obtained both in the state where it was made along with 
the state where enforcement was sought; see also HOLTZMANN & NEUHAUS, 
supra note 106, at 1006–52.   
114 HOLTZMANN & NEHAUS, supra note 106.  
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a particular forum before it may be coercively enforced in 
that forum.115  Pursuant to such confirmation, an award may 
be “recognized” through judicial proceedings.116   
The significance of the absence of the two-cherry 
doctrine in India is highlighted by the fact that premising 
itself on the above, the court declared the ratio of NALCO117 
and Fiza Developers v. AMCI118 as per incuriam for its 
failure to take into due consideration Section 9, Section 35, 
and the second part of Section 36 of the 1996 Act and 
declaring the law incorrectly.  The authors are of the view 
that the SCI noting the interplay of these statutory provisions 
heralded the removal of the automatic stay feature in India’s 
arbitration law.119  Following an extensive analysis of these 
provisions and their legislative intent, the SCI observed that 
the assumption of non-executability of an award owing to a 
challenge under Section 34 was “plainly incorrect.”120  In 
relation to the nature of Section 36, the SCI remarked that 
“the amended Section, being clarificatory in nature merely 
restates the position that the unamended Section 36 does not 
stand in the way of the law as to grant of stay of a money 
decree under the provisions of the CPC, 1908.”121 
According to SCI, Section 36 did not in any way 
infer an automatic stay on the enforcement of awards.122  
Such an interpretation, as per SCI, is also consistent with the 
fundamental tenets enshrined in Section 9 of the 1996 Act, 
which enables a party to apply to a court for relief “after the 
 
115 BORN, supra note 103, at 703–78. 
116 BORN, supra note 103, at 59. 
117 Nat’l Aluminum Co. v. Pressteel & Fabrications Priv. Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 
540 (India). 
118 Fiza Devs. v. AMCI, (2009) 17 SCC 796 (India). 
119 Fiza Devs. v. AMCI, (2009) 17 SCC 796 (India). 
120 Nat’l Aluminum Co. v. Pressteel & Fabrications Priv. Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 
540 (India) or Fiza Devs. v. AMCI, (2009) 17 SCC 796 (India). 
121 Fiza Devs. v. AMCI, (2009) 17 SCC 796 (India). 
122 Nat’l Aluminum Co. v. Pressteel & Fabrications Priv. Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 
540 (India) or Fiza Devs. v. AMCI, (2009) 17 SCC 796 (India). 
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making of the arbitration award but before it is enforced in 
accordance with Section 36.”123  To reinforce this 
observation, it relied upon the ratio in Dirk India Private Ltd 
vs. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Co.: 
12. The second facet of Section 9 is the 
proximate nexus between the orders that 
are sought and the arbitral proceedings.  
When an interim measure of protection is 
sought before or during arbitral 
proceedings, such a measure is a step[-]in 
aid to the fruition of the arbitral 
proceedings.  When sought after an arbitral 
award is made but before it is enforced, the 
measure of protection is intended to 
safeguard the fruit of the proceedings until 
the eventual enforcement of the award.  
Here again the measure of protection is a 
step[-]in aid of enforcement.  It is intended 
to ensure that enforcement of the award 
results in a realisable claim and that the 
award is not rendered illusory by dealings 
that would put the subject of the award 
beyond the pale of enforcement.124 
The court observed that the stated purpose of Section 
36 was for a different, well-illustrated purpose in Leela 
Hotels vs. Housing and Urban Development Corp.: 
45. Regarding the question as to whether 
the award of the learned arbitrator 
tantamounts to a decree or not, the 
language used in Section 36 of the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, 
makes it very clear that such an award has 
 
123 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §9.  
124 Dirk India Priv. Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Elec. Generation Co., 2013 (7) 
Bom CR 493 (India). 
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to be enforced under the Code of Civil 
Procedure in the same manner as it were a 
decree of the court.  The said language 
leaves no room for doubt as to the manner 
in which the award of the learned arbitrator 
was to be accepted.125 
In BCCI,126 the SCI specifically addressed the status 
of Section 34 petitions filed before the commencement of the 
2015 Act, i.e. the veritable interpretation of Section 26 of the 
2015 Act.127  The court deliberated on whether the 
Amendments introduced by the 2015 Act applied to court 
proceedings arising out of arbitrations that were initiated 
before the Cut-Off Date.  In response, it attempted to 
ascertain the constituent elements of “enforcement” under 
the 1996 Act.128  It opined that the legislation stated an award 
be deemed a decree of the court and is enforceable as such 
under provisions of Order XXI and Order LXI, Rule 5 of the 
1908 CPC.129   
The Court’s response to the moot question – the 
applicability of Section 26 of the Act, 2015 to Section 34 
petitions – can be summarized as: 
 
125 Leela Hotels v. Hous. & Urb. Dev. Co., (2012) 1 SCC 302 (India); see also 
Vipul Aggarwal v. Atul Kanodia & Co., AIR 2004 All 205 (India), wherein the 
Petitioner contended that pending disposal of his appeal, the Award was not 
final and hence could not be enforced.  The High Court opined that since stay 
was not granted by the SCI, the execution should proceed as there is no 
automatic stay due to pendency of the appeal. 
126 Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 
1549 (India).  (This was a pre-Amendment, 2019 decision of the SCI.). 
127 See generally Canara Nidhi Ltd. v. M. Shashikala, AIR 2019 SC 4544 (India) 
(holding that an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is a 
summary proceeding not in the nature of a regular suit). 
128 Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 
1549 (India).  (This was a pre-2019 Act decision of the SCI.). 
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(a) The amended 2015 Act would apply to arbitral 
proceedings commenced on or after the Cut-Off 
Date mentioned therein; 
(b) The amended 2015 Act would apply to court 
proceedings arising out of arbitrations filed on or 
after the Cut-Off Date, even where the arbitral 
proceedings were commenced before the 
amendments came into force; and  
(c) The amended 2015 Act would apply to 
applications pending on the Cut-Off Date.130 
The Court further clarified,  
[s]ince it is clear that execution 
of a decree pertains to the realm 
of procedure, and that there is 
no substantive vested right in a 
judgment debtor to resist 
execution, Section 36, as 
substituted, would apply even to 
pending Section 34 applications 
on the date of commencement 
of the Amendment Act.131   
Further, the SCI bifurcated arbitral proceedings and 
court proceedings arising out of arbitral proceedings and 
observed that court-related proceedings cannot be construed 
as a continuation of arbitral proceedings but would be 
viewed separately.132  The Court also recommended the 
legislature take note of the 1996 Statement of Objects and 
Reasons of the Act while implementing the proposed Section 
87 indicated in the Government’s press release dated July 3, 
 
130 Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 
1549 (India).  
131 Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 
1549 (India).  
132 Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 
1549 (India).  
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2018.133  It cautioned against amendments that could undo 
the positive changes ushered in by the 2015 Act and result in 
unwarranted interference by courts that could defeat the 
objects of the 1996 Act.134  
Following the decision in the BCCI case and the 
subsequent changes ushered by the 2019 Act, the SCI’s 
decision in the HCC case assumed significance for the 
arbitral jurisprudence of India.135  The 2019 Act, via Section 
13, introduced Section 87:   
87. Unless the parties otherwise 
agree, the amendments made to 
this Act by the Arbitration and 
Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 
2015 shall-   
(a) not apply to-   
(i) arbitral proceedings 
commenced before the 




2015;   
(ii) court proceedings 
arising out of or in 
relation to such arbitral 
proceedings 
irrespective of whether 
such court proceedings 
are commenced prior 
 
133 Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 
1549 (India).  
134 Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 
1549 (India).  
135 The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019; Hindustan 
Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).; Bd. of Control for 
Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 1549 (India).  
 
29
Garimella and Mohanty: The Faux Pas of Automatic Stay
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2021
[Vol. 21: 195, 2021]                                 The Faux Pas of Automatic Stay 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
 
 224 
to or after the 




2015;   
(b) apply only to arbitral 
proceedings commenced on 
or after the commencement 
of the Arbitration and 
Conciliation (Amendment) 
Act, 2015 and to court 
proceedings arising out of 
or in relation to such 
arbitral proceedings.136   
Further, Section 15 of the 2019 Act omitted Section 
26 of the 2015 Act:137   
15. Section 26 of the Arbitration 
and Conciliation (Amendment) 
Act, 2015 shall be omitted and 
shall be deemed to have been 
omitted with effect from the 
23rd October, 2015.138   
 
136 The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019, §87(a–b). 
137 The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019, §15.   
Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the arbitral 
proceedings commenced, in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 21 of the principal Act, before the 
commencement of this Act unless the parties otherwise 
agree but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral 
proceedings commenced on or after the date of 
commencement of this Act. 
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019, §26. 
138 The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019, §15.   
Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the arbitral 
proceedings commenced, in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 21 of the principal Act, before the 
commencement of this Act unless the parties otherwise 
agree but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral 
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Observing that it was aware of the 
recommendations of the Srikrishna Committee Report,139 
the SCI noted the impact of Section 87 stated herein below:   
78. The immediate effect of the 
proposed Section 87 would be 
to put all the important 
amendments made by the 
Amendment Act on a back-
burner, such as the important 
amendments made to Sections 
28 and 34 in particular, which, 
as has been stated by the 
Statement of Objects and 
Reasons “. . . have resulted in 
delay of disposal of arbitration 
proceedings and increase in 
interference of courts in 
arbitration matters, which tend 
to defeat the object of the Act,” 
and will now not be applicable 
to Section 34 petitions filed 
after 23-10-2015, but will be 
applicable to Section 34 
petitions filed in cases where 
arbitration proceedings have 
themselves commenced only 
after 23-10-2015.  This would 
mean that in all matters which 
are in the pipeline, despite the 
fact that Section 34 proceedings 
have been initiated only after 
 
proceedings commenced on or after the date of 
commencement of this Act. 
The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, §26. 
139 SRIKRISHNA, supra note 71. 
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23-10-2015, yet, the old law 
would continue to apply 
resulting in delay of disposal of 
arbitration proceedings by 
increased interference of courts, 
which ultimately defeats the 
object of the 1996 Act . . . It can 
thus be seen that the scheme of 
Section 87 is different from that 
of Section 26, and is explicit in 
stating that court proceedings 
are merely parasitical on arbitral 
proceedings.140   
In light of this, the SCI opined that the “mischief of 
misconstruction” of Section 36 of the 1996 Act, which was 
corrected by legislative intervention in 2015, would be 
undone by the “retrospective resurrection” of an automatic 
stay that was antithetical to the object and reasons of the 
1996 Act.141  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE 2019 
AMENDMENT ACT, 2019   
Before the enactment of the 2015 Act, the filing of 
an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act would 
automatically stay execution proceedings of an award under 
Section 36 of the 1996 Act.142  The 2015 Act removed this 
automatic stay and mandated the filing of a separate 
application to seek a stay on the execution proceedings.143  
The aforesaid application, per Section 19 of the 2015 Act, 
required a deposit to be made and would be only granted at 
the discretion of the courts.144   
 The BCCI ratio specified that the amended 
provisions of Section 36 of the 1996 Act were applicable to 
 
140 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
141 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
142 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34(1–6). 
143 The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, §19(2). 
144 The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, §19(2–3). 
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pending arbitration proceedings.145  As such, irrespective of 
the commencement of arbitration before the amendments 
were enacted, no automatic stay will apply to court 
proceedings arising out of such arbitrations even if such 
court proceedings are filed after the Cut-Off Date.146  The 
date, definitive for the operation of the 2015 Amendment, 
nevertheless signified the date of the 2015 Act coming into 
force and nothing more.147   
Notably, Section 87 of the 2019 Act prescribed two 
timelines, retrospectively effective from the Cut-Off Date 
viz.: (i) arbitral proceedings and court proceedings arising 
out of such arbitral proceedings initiated before the Cut-Off 
Date and (ii) arbitral proceedings and court proceedings 
arising out of such arbitral proceedings initiated on or after 
the Cut-Off Date.148  Section 87 of the 2019 Act thus 
resurrected the “automatic stay,” which was removed by the 
amendments introduced by the 2015 Act.149   
In HCC, the SCI examined the constitutional 
validity of Section 87 introduced into the 1996 Act by the 
2019 Act, and the deletion of Section 26 of the 2015 Act as 
against well-established principles envisaged in the 
constitutional jurisprudence of India.150  The fulcrum of the 
arguments on constitutionality rested upon Articles 14, 
19(1), 21, and 300-A of the 1950 Constitution.151   
The Petitioners (Appellants) contended that Section 
87 of the 2019 Act was violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 21, 
and 300-A of the 1950 Constitution, as:   
 
145 Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 
1549 (India). 
146 See The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36. 
147 The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015. 
148 The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019, §87. 
149 See The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015. 
150 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
151 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
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(i) it defeated the purposes and objectives of 
the Act, 1996;   
(ii) operate[s] against the award creditor’s 
right to enforce the arbitral award;   
(iii) undermines the binding nature of an 
arbitral award; and   
(iv) operates against the ratio laid down in the 
BCCI and is therefore unreasonable, 
excessive, disproportionate, and 
arbitrary.152  
The Petitioners further contended that in a situation 
where an award-creditor is unable to enforce the award on 
account of the automatic stay, it could possibly lead to 
absurd situations, exemplified in the situation in the HCC 
case.153  To reinforce their argument, the Petitioners also 
attempted to highlight an anomaly in the retrospective 
resurrection of the automatic stay by arguing that the same 
allows a window of opportunity for award-debtors to claim 
refunds of monies already paid to an award holder pending 
application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.154  
Per contra, the thrust of Respondents’ argument was 
that merely signifying a cut-off date in the 2019 Act155 
cannot be considered to be violating the Constitution as it is 
Parliament’s prerogative to fix such a cut-off date and courts 
cannot interfere in policy matters.156  The Attorney General 
for India, defending the repeal of Section 26 of the 2015 Act 
 
152 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
153 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India).  The 
petitioners alluded to the financial difficulties faced by the award-holder yet 
unable to make payments due leading to actions under the Insolvency and 
Bankruptcy Code of 2016.  Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 
SC 122 (India). 
154 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
155 The effective cut-off date in the present context is October 23, 2015.  
Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
156 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India); UOI v. 
Parameswaran Match Works, (1975) 1 SCC 305, ¶ 102 (India); Govt. of A.P. 
v. N. Subbarayudu, (2008) 14 SCC 702 (India). 
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and the insertion of Section 87 of the 2019 Act, referred to 
BCCI to argue that interpretation of Section 26 of the 2015 
Act was merely declaratory in nature.157  Further, the 
Respondents averred that since BCCI does not set aside any 
executive action, “nor any provision of statute, it does not 
require a validating act to neutralize its effect.”158  They 
argued that Parliament retained the power to clarify the 
legislative intent were it to find that the SCI’s ratio did not 
reflect the same.159  They further argued that identifying the 
definitive date of enforcement remained within the exclusive 
domain of the Parliament.160  
The Court prefaced its analysis with a verbatim 
reference to the Srikrishna Committee Report’s 
recommendation on the introduction of Section 87:161  
However, Section 26 has remained 
silent on the applicability of the 
2015 amendment Act to court 
proceedings, both pending and 
newly initiated in case of 
arbitrations commenced prior to 23 
October 2015.  Different High 
Courts in India have taken divergent 
views on the applicability of the 
2015 Amendment Act to such court 
proceedings. Broadly, there are 
three sets of views as summarised 
below:   
(a) The 2015 Amendment Act is 
not applicable to court 
proceedings (fresh and pending) 
 
157 Bd. of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Priv. Ltd., AIR 2018 SC 
1549 (India). 
158 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
159 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
160 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
161 SRIKRISHNA, supra note 71, at 60–61.  
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where the arbitral proceedings 
to which they relate commenced 
before 23 October 2015. 
(b) The first part of Section 26 
is narrower than the second and 
only excludes arbitral 
proceedings commenced prior 
to 23 October 2015 from the 
application of the 2015 
Amendment Act. The 2015 
Amendment Act would, 
however, apply to fresh or 
pending court proceedings in 
relation to arbitral proceedings 
commenced prior to 23 October 
2015. 
(c) The wording “arbitral 
proceedings” in Section 26 
cannot be construed to include 
related court proceedings. 
Accordingly, the 2015 
Amendment Act applied to all 
arbitrations commenced on or 
after 23 October 2015. As far as 
court proceedings are 
concerned, the 2015 
Amendment Act would apply to 
all court proceedings from 23 
October 2015, including fresh 
or pending court proceedings in 
relation to arbitration 
commenced before, on or after 
23 October 2015.162   
Thus, it is evident that there is considerable 
confusion regarding the applicability of the 
 
162 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
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2015 Amendment Act to related court 
proceedings in arbitration commenced 
before October 23, 2015.  The Committee 
is of the view that a suitable legislative 
amendment is required to address this 
issue. . . .  Therefore, it is felt that it may be 
desirable to limit the applicability of the 
2015 Amendment Act to arbitration 
commenced on or after 23 October 2015 
and related court proceedings.163 
The SCI adopted a three-pronged approach to address the 
averments of the Parties.164  In the first prong of its analysis, 
the Court observed that Section 34 of the 1996 Act envisaged 
summary proceedings in the court.165  The result, in essence, 
is that courts do not sit on an appeal while hearing the 
causae.166  Such being the case, the SCI remarked that an 
anomaly occurs upon insertion of Section 87 into the 1996 
Act.167  The anomaly that the Court was referring to was 
Order XLI Rule 5 of the 1908 CPC.168  This Order stipulates 
 
163 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
164 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
165 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 181 (India); see 
also Ssangyong Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. NHAI, AIR 2019 SC 504, 563 (India) 
(holding that after the 2015 Act, the SCI cannot interfere with an arbitral award 
on merits).  
166 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India); see also 
Associated Constr. v. Pawanhans Helicopters Ltd., 16 SCC 128, 153 (2008) 
(India) (holding that a court reviewing an arbitral award under Section 34 does 
not sit in appeal over the award, and if the view taken by the arbitrator is 
possible, no interference is called for). 
167 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
168 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India); Code of 
Civil Procedure, 1908, Ord. XLI Rule 5: 
(1) An appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings 
under a decree or order appealed from except so far as the 
Appellate Court may order, nor shall execution of a decree 
be stayed by reason only of an appeal having been 
preferred from the decree; but the Appellate Court may for 
sufficient cause order stay of execution of such decree. 
[Explanation—An order by the Appellate Court for the stay 
of execution of the decree shall be effective from the date 
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that merely filing an appeal from a decree does not act as an 
automatic stay.169  Rather, to obtain a stay the party has to 
file an application seeking the discretion of the appellate 
courts.170  In comparison, the insertion of Section 87 of the 
2019 Act ensured that arbitral awards are subject to a 
different rule and threshold than the rule stipulated in Order 
XLI Rule 5.171  This is due to the invocation of an automatic 
stay when an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act 
 
of the communication of such order to the Court of first 
instance, but an affidavit sworn by the appellant, based on 
his personal knowledge, stating that an order for the stay of 
execution of the decree has been made by the Appellate 
Court shall, pending the receipt from the Appellate Court 
of the order for the stay of execution or any order to the 
contrary, be acted upon by the Court of first instance.]. 
(2) Stay by Court which passed the decree-Where an 
application is made for stay of execution of an appealable 
decree before the expiration of the time allowed for 
appealing therefrom, the Court which passed the decree 
may on sufficient cause being shown order the execution 
to be stayed. 
(3) No order for stay of execution shall be made under sub-
rule (1) or sub-rule (2) unless the Court making it is 
satisfied- 
(a) that substantial loss may result to the party applying for 
stay of execution unless the order is made; 
(b) that the application has been made without 
unreasonable delay; and 
(c) that security has been given by the applicant for the due 
performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be 
binding upon him. 
[(4) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3)], the Court 
may make an ex parte order for stay of execution pending 
the hearing of the application. 
[(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing 
sub-rules, where the appellant fails to make the deposit or 
furnish the security specified in sub-rule (3) of rule 1, the 
Court shall not make an order staying the execution of the 
decree.]. 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Ord. XLI Rule 5 
169 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Ord. XLI Rule 4.  
170 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Ord. XLI Rule 4. 
171 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
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has been filed.172  The juxtaposition between Order XLI Rule 
5 of the 1908 CPC and Section 87 of the 2019 Act—which 
the Court attempted to highlight—is encapsulated in the 
proviso of Section 36 of the 2015 Act.173  This section 
stipulates that the Court, “when considering an application 
for grant of stay in the case of an arbitral award for payment 
of money, [will] have due regard to the provisions for grant 
of stay of a money decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 
1908.”174  Thus, according to the SCI, the aforesaid anomaly 
makes Section 87 manifestly arbitrary to Article 14 of the 
1950 Constitution, so it was therefore liable to be struck 
down.175  Notably, the SCI observed “when the mischief of 
the misconstruction of Section 36 was corrected after a 
period of more than [nineteen] years by legislative 
intervention in 2015, to now work in the reverse direction 
and bring back the aforesaid mischief itself results in 
manifest arbitrariness.”176  The Court therefore held that the 
legislature, by its failure to duly note the development of law 
on the issue of automatic stay and amending the law in 
complete disregard of the legal jurisprudence developed by 
the 2015 Act—especially BCCI—had acted in contravention 
to the objects and purposes of the 1996 Act.177  The Court 
observed that the legislature, before pursuing the amendment 
leading to the insertion, could have drawn insights from 
BCCI—which had alerted against the introduction of Section 
87 and did not urge reliance upon the Srikrishna Committee 
 
172 Singh & Associates, Automatic Stay of Enforcement Of The Arbitration 
Award Upon Admission of Challenge Under Section 34 Of The Arbitration And 





173 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
174 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 160 (India). 
175 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 182 (India). 
176 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 182 (India). 
177 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
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Report.178  The Court noted that said amendment to the 1996 
Act could lead to excessive judicial interference, and 
therefore was unreasonable, arbitrary, and against public 
interest.179 
In its second prong of the analysis, the SCI stated 
that Section 87 of the 2019 Act does not consider the 
implications and economic hardships imposed upon an 
award holder under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code of 
2016.180  Under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, award 
creditors are unable to recover operational debts under an 
award owing to the operation of automatic stay, thereby 
having to bear the brunt of an insolvency application from 
their creditors.181  Accordingly, the SCI summed up its 
above observations by holding that Section 87 of the 1996 
Act violated Article 14 of the 1950 Constitution because it 
imposed unwarranted economic hardships on the award 
creditor and resurrected a window for judicial 
interference.182   
In its last prong of the analysis, the SCI held that all 
of the Respondent’s averments that were directed towards 
fixing the Cut-Off Date were misguided because the date 
was merely the point in time in which the 2015 Act came 
into force.183  Instead, the non-bifurcation of Court 
proceedings and arbitration proceedings with reference to 
the date of October 23, 2015—the date on which the 2015 
Act was brought into force—is manifestly arbitrary as it 
unduly results in putting the positive changes introduced by 
the 2015 Act on a “backburner.”184  
The application of constitutional principles to 
various facets of arbitration has assumed significance 
 
178 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122 (India). 
179 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 128, 180 (India). 
180 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 183 (India). 
181 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 183 (India). 
182 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 183–84 (India). 
183 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 185 (India). 
184 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 182 (India). 
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because emerging trends suggest that courts have not 
hesitated in resorting to the usage of constitutional principles 
to protect public interest and ensure the effective 
implementation of the aims and objectives of the 1996 
Act.185  For example, in Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State 
Water Supply, the arbitration clause186 stipulated a pre-
deposit of ten percent of the amount claimed until the 
announcement of the award with the goal of reducing 
frivolous claims.187  The clause further postulated that in the 
 
185 Mohammad Kamran, Ashish Kabra, & Vyapak Desai, Return of the Jedi: 
Supreme Court Strikes Down Section 87 of the Arbitration Act, NISHITH DESAI 
ASSOCIATES (Dec. 5, 2019), http://nishithdesai.com/information/news-
storage/news-details/article/return-of-the-jedi-supreme-court-strikes-down-
section-87-of-the-arbitration-act.html. 
186 Clause 25(viii) of the contract, which entailed the arbitration clause is as 
follows: 
It shall be an essential term of this contract that in order 
to avoid frivolous claims the party invoking arbitration 
shall specify the dispute based on facts and calculations 
stating the amount claimed under each claim and shall 
furnish a "deposit-at-call" for ten percent of the amount 
claimed, on a Schedule bank in the name of the 
Arbitrator by his official designation who shall keep the 
amount in deposit till the announcement of the award. In 
the event of an award in favour of the claimant, the 
deposit shall be refunded to him in proportion to the 
amount awarded w.r.t. the amount claimed and the 
balance, if any, shall be forfeited and paid to the other 
party. 
Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Bd., 2019 (2) 
ARBLR 359, 363 (SC) (India). 
187 Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Bd., 2019 (2) 
ARBLR 359 (SC) (India). The arbitration clause Clause 25(viii) states:  
viii. It shall be an essential term of this contract that in 
order to avoid frivolous claims the party invoking 
arbitration shall specify the dispute based on facts and 
calculations stating the amount claimed under each claim 
and shall furnish a "deposit-at-call" for ten percent of the 
amount claimed, on a Schedule bank in the name of the 
Arbitrator by his official designation who shall keep the 
amount in deposit till the announcement of the award. In 
the event of an award in favour of the claimant, the 
deposit shall be refunded to him in proportion to the 
amount awarded w.r.t. the amount claimed and the 
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event of a favorable award, the deposit made before the 
commencement of arbitration would be refunded in the 
proportion of the amount awarded, and the remaining 
balance would be forfeited and paid to the other party.188  On 
appeal, the SCI held that the requirement of a pre-deposit 
was without any direct nexus to the filing of frivolous 
claims, as the pre-deposit was to be paid at the threshold 
before commencing arbitration proceedings.189  In light of 
the aforesaid, the Court remarked that the arbitral clause in 
the contract was not only arbitrary under Article 14 of the 
1950 Constitution, but it was also unfair and unjust, as there 
existed no discernible way for the law to ascertain whether a 
claim was frivolous or not.190  The terminology employed in 
the arbitration clause of the contract, according to the SCI, 
not only failed to align with the aims and objectives of the 
1996 Act, but also rendered the entire clause arbitrary as it 
was not only excessive, but also invariably led to an unjust 
result.191  
Therefore, for the reasons enumerated above, the 
SCI ultimately held that the ratio of BCCI stood on firm 
legal ground, thereby necessarily implying that the 
automatic stay resurrected by the 2019 Act was struck down, 
 
balance, if any, shall be forfeited and paid to the other 
party. 
Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Bd., 
2019 (2) ARBLR 359 (SC) (India). 
188 Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Bd., 2019 (2) 
ARBLR 359, 360 (SC) (India). 
189 Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Bd., 2019 (2) 
ARBLR 359, 375 (SC) (India). 
190 Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Bd., 2019 (2) 
ARBLR 359, 370–71 (SC) (India) (quoting ABL Int’l Ltd. v. Export Credit 
Guarantee Corp. of India, 3 SCC 553 (2004) (India)). 
191 Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Bd., 2019 (2) 
ARBLR 359, 379 (SC) (India) (observing that “deterring a party to an 
arbitration from invoking this alternative dispute resolution process by a pre-
deposit of ten percent would discourage arbitration, contrary to the object of de-
clogging the Court system, and would render the arbitral process ineffective and 
expensive.”). 
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and all amendments made by the 2015 Act would continue 
to apply to all court proceedings after October 23, 2015.192  
Notably, a key finding of BCCI—which finds reaffirmation 
in this decision—is that the introduction of Section 87 would 
result in an inordinate delay in the disposal of arbitration 
proceedings, as well as increased judicial intervention—
contrary to the objects of the 1996 Act.193  Lastly, having 
already held that Section 87 violated Article 14 of the 1950 
Constitution, the SCI deemed it unnecessary to examine the 
constitutional challenge to the 2019 Act based on Article 
19(1)(g), 21 and 300-A of the 1950 Constitution.194 
IV. ENFORCING ARBITRAL AWARDS – WAY 
FORWARD FOR THE AWARD DEBTOR AND 
AWARD CREDITOR 
The HCC decision ensured that awards are 
enforceable per se as envisioned in the objects and purposes 
of the 1996 Act; courts henceforth shall decide applications 
for adjourning enforcement pending an application for 
setting aside the award.195  In saying so, the dictum reiterated 
that any opinion contrary to the above-stated principle would 
only highlight the futility of the arbitral process and result in 
the denial of the benefits derived from the award.196  
Noting the possibility of the award debtor and the 
creditor rushing to the court for their respective applications 
for relief, this research attempts to understand the rights of 
the respective parties to an arbitration when applying for 
post-award relief.  The following narrative identifies the 
relevant legal provisions and the procedure for making such 
applications.  The authors suggest, exemplifying through 
jurisprudence from common law jurisdictions such as 
England and Hong Kong, that Indian courts could exercise 
 
192 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 2020 SC 122, 182 (India). 
193 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR SC 122, 180 (2020) (India). 
194 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR SC 122, 185 (2020) (India). 
195 Hindustan Constr. Co. v. Union of India, AIR SC 122 (2020) (India). 
196 Icomm Tele Ltd. v. Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Bd., 2019 (2) 
ARBLR 359, 360 (SC) (India). 
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the discretion on staying enforcement of the arbitral 
awards—sparingly, and for well-founded reasons—with 
adequate security for the enforcement when the application 
to set-aside remains sub-judice. 
Pending a decision upon an enforcement application 
by the award-creditor, the award-debtor could utilise a few 
legal provisions for relief.197  The first step in this regard is 
the authority on interim measures.198  Section 9 of the 1996 
Act helps preserve the various pursuits and rights of the 
parties to the arbitration.199  As evidenced by the text of this 
provision, the parties can apply for post-award interim 
measures; however, such an application could also be 
pursued in conjunction with an application under section 34 
 
197 Kartikey Mahajan, Making the Case for Post-Award Interim Relief for 
Award Debtor, 3 INDIAN J. ARB. L. 14, 14 (2014). 
198 Mahajan, supra note 197, at 15.  
199 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §9. 
Interim measures, etc., by Court.—A party may, before 
or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the 
making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in 
accordance with section 36, apply to a court—(i) for the 
appointment of a guardian for a minor or a person of 
unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; 
or (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of 
any of the following matters, namely:—(a) the 
preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which 
are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) 
securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; (c) the 
detention, preservation or inspection of any property or 
thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in 
arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein 
and authorizing for any of the aforesaid purposes any 
person to enter upon any land or building in the 
possession of any party, or authorizing any samples to be 
taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be 
tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the 
purpose of obtaining full information or evidence; (d) 
interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; (e) 
such other interim measure of protection as may appear 
to the court to be just and convenient, And the Court shall 
have the same power for making orders as it has for the 
purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it.   
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §9. 
44
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol21/iss1/7
[Vol. 21: 195, 2021]                                 The Faux Pas of Automatic Stay 
                                             PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
 
 239 
of the 1996 Act for declaration of the arbitral award as a 
nullity.200  An interim order helps secure the immediate 
purpose of protecting the subject matter of the arbitration.201  
These orders help prevent the claim from being frustrated in 
arbitration.202  The award-debtor could consider applying for 
interim measures to secure the arbitral claim from being 
alienated or rendered otiose while the court considers the 
Section 34 application in order to protect its interests.203  The 
importance of an application for interim protection measures 
is heightened by the possibility that were the award-debtor 
to be successful in a proceeding to set aside the arbitral 
award, it would still not be of any material value if the 
subject matter itself has been irretrievably lost.204  The 
award-debtor could also take the benefit of a Section 9 
application when the court has, per section 34(4) of the 1996 
Act, decided to adjourn the proceedings and return the award 
to the tribunal for reconsideration.205  In Firm Ashok Traders 
v. Das Saluja,206 the SCI held that a Section 9 application 
could be made by any party to an arbitration agreement as 
per the requisites specified therein.207  
“Party” is defined in Clause (h) of Sub- 
section (1) of Section 2 of A & C Act to 
mean a party to an arbitration agreement.  
So, the right conferred by Section 9 is on a 
party to an arbitration agreement.  The time 
or the stage for invoking the jurisdiction of 
Court under Section 9 can be (i) before, or 
(ii) during arbitral proceeding, or (iii) at 
 
200 Mahajan, supra note 197, at 18. 
201 Mahajan, supra note 197, at 17. 
202 Mahajan, supra note 197, at 16. 
203 Mahajan, supra note 197, at 17. 
204 Mahajan, supra note 197, at 17. 
205 Mahajan, supra note 197, at 17 n. 14; see also Cybernetics Network, Priv. 
Ltd. v. Bisquare Techs., Priv. Ltd., (2012) 188 D.L.T. 172 (India). 
206 Firm Ashok Traders v. Das Saluja, (2004) 3 SCC 155 (India). 
207 Kartikey Mahajan, Making the Case for Post-Award Interim Relief for 
Award Debtor, 3 INDIAN J. ARB. L. 14, 19 (2014). 
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any time after the making of the arbitral 
award but before it is enforced in 
accordance with Section 36.208 
 
The Delhi High Court in NHAI v. China Coal 
Construction Group Corp. relied on the abovementioned 
precedent when it ruled that a Section 9 application of the 
parties to the arbitration agreement is available until the 
enforcement application is decided upon under Section 36 of 
the 1996 Act.209  
Reading the section as a whole it appears to 
us that the court has jurisdiction to entertain 
an application under Section 9 either 
before arbitral proceedings or during 
arbitral proceedings or after the making of 
the arbitral award but before it is enforced 
in accordance with Section 36 of the 
Act.210 
The award-debtor could also apply for setting aside 
the arbitral award under Section 34.211  Setting aside 
procedures act as a check on the arbitrators, to prevent them 
from acting beyond the scope of their authority.212  The law 
requires that all arbitral awards shall be spoken orders and 
mandates recorded for the same reasons.213  In State Trading 
 
208 Mahajan, supra note 197, at 19 (alteration in original) (quoting Arbitration 
and Conciliation Act § 9). 
209 NHAI v. China Coal Constr. Group Corp., AIR 2006 Delhi 134 (India). 
210 NHAI v. China Coal Constr. Group Corp., AIR 2006 Delhi 134 (India). 
211 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §43. 
212 K.D. Kerameus, Waiver of Setting-Aside Procedures in International 
Arbitration, 41 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 73, 73–74 (1993).  
213 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §31.  
31. Form and contents of arbitral award.— . . . . (3) The 
arbitral award shall state the reasons upon which it is 
based, unless— 
 (a) the parties have agreed that no reasons are 
to be given, or 
 (b) the award is an arbitral award on agreed 
terms under section 30. 
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Corp. of India v. Toepfer International Asia, Private Ltd.,214 
the Delhi High Court explained that an order to set aside an 
arbitral award “operates to negate a decision, in whole or in 
part, thereby depriving the portion negated of legal force and 
returning the parties, as to that portion, to their original 
litigating positions.”215  This shall be attempted based upon 
the record of the lis, and there shall be no evidence adduced 
by the court.216  In P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers, 
Private Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities, Priv. Ltd.,217 the Court 
observed,  
A court does not sit in appeal over the 
award of an arbitral tribunal by re-
assessing or re-appreciating the evidence.  
An award can be challenged only under the 
grounds mentioned in section 34(2) of the 
Act. . . . Therefore, in the absence of any 
ground under section 34(2) of the Act, it is 
not possible to re-examine the facts to find 
 
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §31. 
214 State Trading Corp. of India v. Toepfer Int’l Asia, Priv. Ltd., 2014 ARBLR 
105 (Delhi) (India). 
215 State Trading Corp. of India v. Toepfer Int’l Asia, Priv. Ltd., 2014 ARBLR 
105 (Delhi) (India);      
 see also Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam, Ltd. v. Reddy, AIR 2007 SC 817 (India) 
(discussing the position of setting aside partial awards).  The Supreme Court 
has modified arbitral awards by reducing the rate of interest.  Krishna Bhagya 
Jala Nigam, Ltd. v. Reddy, AIR 2007 SC 817 (India).  But see Chief Eng’r v. 
Chandragiri Constr. Co. 2011 (2) CTC 669 (India); (the Madras High Court 
modifying the decision of the district court by dismissing the petition for setting 
aside the award by reducing the rate of interest awarded by the Tribunal);   see 
also Poysha Oxygen, Priv. Ltd. v. Suri, ILR (2009) Supp. (3) Delhi 223. 
216 In Sial Bioenergie v. SBEC Sys., the High Court of Delhi inter alia held "the 
whole purpose of the 1996 Act would be completely defeated by granting 
permission to the applicant/JD to lead oral evidence at the stage of objections 
raised against an arbitral award.  The 1996 Act requires expeditious disposal of 
the objections and the minimal interference by the Court. . . .”  AIR 2005 Del 
95 (India). 
217 P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers, Priv. Ltd. v. B.H.H. Secs., Priv. Ltd., 
(2012) 1 SCC 594 (India). 
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out whether a different decision can be 
arrived at.218 
Section 34 provides “for annulment only on the grounds 
affecting the legitimacy of the process of decision as distinct 
from substantive correctness of the contents of the 
decision.”219  A Section 34 application, therefore, 
necessarily does not result in the court becoming an 
appellate forum for relief.220  In Associate Builders v. Delhi 
Development Authority,221 the SCI explained that: 
An arbitral tribunal must decide in 
accordance with the terms of the contract, 
but if an arbitrator construes a term of the 
contract in a reasonable manner, it will not 
mean that the award can be set aside on this 
ground.  Construction of the terms of a 
contract is primarily for an arbitrator to 
decide unless the arbitrator construes the 
contract in such a way that it could be said 
to be something that no fair minded or 
reasonable person could do.222 
Given the legislative objectives and the emphasis 
against judicial intervention, the award-debtor could 
consider applying to the court for remission of the award to 
the tribunal.223  Informed by Article 34(4) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, section 34(4) of the 1996 Act 
provides for the suspension of setting aside proceedings by 
the court for a period determined by it, where appropriate 
and so requested by a party, to allow the arbitral tribunal an 
opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take 
such other action as in the arbitral tribunal’s opinion will 
 
218 P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers Priv. Ltd. v. B.H.H. Sec. Priv. Ltd. 
(2012) 1 SCC 594 (India). 
219 Delhi Dev. Auth. v. Bhardwaj Brothers, AIR 2014 DELHI 147 (India). 
220 Delhi Dev. Auth. v. Bhardwaj Brothers, AIR 2014 DELHI 147 (India). 
221 Assoc. Builders v. Delhi Dev. Auth., 2014 (4) ARBLR 307 (SC) (India). 
222 Assoc. Builders v. Delhi Dev. Auth., 2014 (4) ARBLR 307 (SC) (India). 
223 See The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §43.  
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eliminate the grounds available for setting aside an award.224  
In Dyna Technologies, Private Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves, 
Ltd.,225 the award was found to be unintelligible and 
inadequately reasoned, and the SCI explained that the 
legislative intention of section 34(4) of the 1996 Act “was to 
make the award enforceable, after giving an opportunity to 
the arbitral tribunal to undo curable defects.”226  
Remission applications could also be made when 
the arbitration tribunal overlooked a particular “claim on 
which the parties led evidence and addressed arguments.”227  
A party denied the opportunity to present its case i.e., to deal 
with a document relied upon by the arbitral tribunal, could 
also apply for remission.228  The SCI in Radha Chemicals v. 
Union of India explained that parties seeking remission as 
 
224 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34; see also U.N. COMM’N ON 
INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 1985 WITH AMENDMENTS AS ADOPTED IN 2006, at 20, U.N. 
Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2008). 
225 Dyna Techs., Priv. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves, Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 
1656 (India). 
226 Dyna Techs., Priv. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves, Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 
1656 (India). 
227 See generally Geojit Fin. Servs., Ltd. v. Nagpal, (Appeal No. 35 of 2013 in 
Arbitration Petition No. 47 of 2009 Bombay HC).  In Reliance Indus., Ltd. v. 
Union of India, the English Commercial Court considered a remitted award 
under the English Arbitration Act of 1996.  [2020] EWHC (Comm) 263 (Eng.).  
In a dispute concerning issues of cost recovery in relation to two production 
sharing contracts, the court laid a roadmap, elaborating upon the Tribunal’s task 
when addressing remitted issues.  Reliance Indus., Ltd. v. Union of India, 
[2020] EWHC (Comm) 263 (Eng.).  The principles specified in the decision 
were: (a) in spite of an intention to reject a case, the Tribunal was still obligated 
to issue an award containing that decision which should take into account any 
evidence which was on the record but not considered by the Tribunal; and (b) 
the issues to be remitted to the Tribunal have to be explicitly specified in the 
court’s order of remission.  Reliance Indus., Ltd. v. Union of India, [2020] 
EWHC (Comm) 263 (Eng.); see also Andrew Cannon & Hannah Ambrose, 
English Court considers challenges to a further award made after Remission to 




228 MMTC v. Vicnivass Agency, 2009 (1) MLJ 199 (India). 
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per section 34(4) of the 1996 Act must do so before the court 
decided upon the set-aside application in the Section 34 
proceedings.229  
Subsection (3) of Section 34 specifies that an 
application for setting aside the award may be made within 
a period of three months from the date of delivery of the 
award; the award-debtor could apply for an extension of this 
period by thirty days to the court which may satisfy itself as 
to the explanation for the delay.230  In Union of India v. 
Popular Construction Co., the Court was called to decide 
upon the applicability of the Limitation Act of 1963 (“1963 
Act”) to an application for setting aside the arbitral award 
under section 34.231  Noting, apart from other provisions of 
the 1996 Act, the intention of the legislature as evident in the 
wording of the proviso of Section 34(3) which states “but 
not thereafter[,]” the Court held against such application of 
the 1963 Act.232  Where an application for correction or 
modification of the award, as per Section 33,233 is pending 
 
229 Radha Chems. v. Union of India, (Order dated Oct. 10, 2018, Sup. Ct. in Civ. 
Appeal No. 10386 of 2018) (India); see also Mullick v. Das Damani, (2018) 11 
SCC 328 (India). 
230 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34:  
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made 
after three months have elapsed from the date on which 
the party making that application had received the 
arbitral award or, if a request had been made under 
section 33, from the date on which that request had been 
disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the 
Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by 
sufficient cause from making the application within the 
said period of three months it may entertain the 
application within a further period of thirty days, but not 
thereafter.  
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, § 34; see Exec. Eng’r v. Satya 
Prakash & Brothers, Priv. Ltd., 2018 (4) ARBLR 241 (Allahabad) (India). 
231 Union of India v. Popular Constr. Co., AIR 2001 SC 4010 (India). 
232 Union of India v. Popular Constr. Co., AIR 2001 SC 4010 (India). 
233 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §33: 
Correction and interpretation of award; additional 
award— 
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before the arbitral tribunal, the limitation would start running 
from the date on which the request has been disposed of by 
the tribunal.234 
Section 37 of the 1996 Act specifies the statutory 
right to appeal against certain orders explicitly mentioned in 
 
(1) Within thirty days from the receipt of the 
arbitral award, unless another period of time has been 
agreed upon by the parties—(a) a party, with notice to 
the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to 
correct any computation errors, any clerical or 
typographical errors or any other errors of a similar 
nature occurring in the award; (b) if so agreed by the 
parties, a party, with notice to the other party, may 
request the arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of a 
specific point or part of the award. 
(2) If the arbitral tribunal considers the 
request made under sub-section (1) to be justified, it shall 
make the correction or give the interpretation within 
thirty days from the receipt of the request and the 
interpretation shall form part of the arbitral award. 
(3) The arbitral tribunal may correct any error 
of the type referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1), on 
its own initiative, within thirty days from the date of the 
arbitral award. 
(4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a 
party with notice to the other party, may request, within 
thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award, the 
arbitral tribunal to make an additional arbitral award as 
to claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but 
omitted from the arbitral award. 
(5) If the arbitral tribunal considers the 
request made under sub-section (4) to be justified, it shall 
make the additional arbitral award within sixty days from 
the receipt of such request. 
(6) The arbitral tribunal may extend, if 
necessary, the period of time within which it shall make 
a correction, give an interpretation or make an additional 
arbitral award under sub-section (2) or sub-section (5). 
(7) Section 31 shall apply to a correction or 
interpretation of the arbitral award or to an additional 
arbitral award made under this section. 
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §33. 
234 Himachal Pradesh v. Himachal Techno Eng’rs, (2010) 12 SCC 210 (India) 
(citing The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34(3)). 
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the aforesaid provision.235  It is important to note that the 
phrase “an appeal shall lie from the following orders (and 
from no others)” leads to the inescapable conclusion that the 
legislature has taken away the right to appeal against all 
orders except as specified in sub-clauses (1) and (2).236  
Notably, the appealable orders allowed by the section are: (i) 
granting or refusing to grant any interim measure of 
protection by the court under section 9; (ii) setting aside or 
refusing to set aside an arbitral award by the court under 
section 34; (iii) accepting the plea of lack of its jurisdiction 
by the arbitral tribunal under section 16(2); (iv) accepting the 
plea of excess of scope of its authority by the arbitral tribunal 
under section 16(3); and (v) granting or refusing to grant an 
interim measure of protection by the arbitral tribunal under 
section 17.237  
For the present research, the authors will analyze 
the overlap and interplay between the 1963 Act and Section 
37 of the 1996 Act to highlight specific time constraints 
which an aggrieved award-debtor and award-creditor must 
adhere to.  It is important to note that the limitation 
prescribed under Section 34(3) for an application to set aside 
an award is four months, including a gratis of thirty days in 
case the applicant shows sufficient cause.238  Similarly, in 
Union of India v. Varindera Construction Ltd,239 the SCI 
found the delay to be 142 days in filing the appeal and 103 
days in refiling the appeal.240  Observing that there was no 
sufficient cause made out explaining the delay, and that the 
appeal was filed after the expiry of 120 days, the SCI refused 
to entertain the appeal.241  It opined,  
 
235 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §43. 
236 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §43. 
237 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §37. 
238 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34(3). 
239 Union of India v. Varindera Const. Ltd, (2020) 2 SCC 111 (India). 
240 Union of India v. Varindera Const. Ltd, (2020) 2 SCC 111 (India). 
241 Union of India v. Varindera Const. Ltd, (2020) 2 SCC 111 (India). 
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any delay beyond 120 days in the filing of 
an appeal under § 37 from an application 
being either dismissed or allowed under § 
34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 
1996 should not be allowed as it will defeat 
the overall statutory purpose of arbitration 
proceedings being decided with utmost 
dispatch.242 
The SCI echoed this position in a recent decision in 
N.V. International v. State of Assam,243 wherein it expressed 
disfavor for condoning any delay beyond 120 days in filing 
an appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act.  The Court 
observed, 
[w]e may only add that what we have done 
in the aforesaid judgment is to add to the 
period of ninety days, which is provided by 
statute for filing of appeals under [Section] 
37 of the Arbitration Act, a grace period of 
thirty days under Section 5 of the 
Limitation Act by following Lachmeshwar 
Prasad Shukul and Others (supra), as also 
having regard to the object of speedy 
resolution of all arbitral disputes which was 
uppermost in the minds of the framers of 
the 1996 Act, and which has been 
strengthened from time to time by 
amendments made thereto.  The present 
delay being beyond 120 days is not liable, 
therefore, to be condoned.244 
Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the 1996 Act allows courts to 
address the award through the lens of public policy, however 
the term itself remained undefined except for guidance 
provided in the explanation stating that an award induced by 
 
242 Union of India v. Varindera Const. Ltd, (2020) 2 SCC 111 (India). 
243 N.V. International v. State of Assam, 2020(1) ARBLR 472 (SC) (India). 
244 N.V. International v. State of Assam, 2020(1) ARBLR 472 (SC) (India). 
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fraud or corruption would infringe upon India’s public 
policy.245  The 1940 Act did not mention public policy, 
though Section 30 said that an award could be set aside if the 
same “had been improperly procured or was otherwise 
invalid.”246  The Act borrowed the content of public policy, 
as applied to arbitration, from the Indian Contract Act of 
1872.247  In Central Inland Water Transport Corp. v. 
Brojonath Ganguly, the SCI explained the content of public 
policy as a dynamic concept guided by public interest, public 
good, and above all, the constitutional principles of 
fundamental rights and directive principles.248 
The contours of public policy in the context of 
arbitration were subjected to extensive articulation in ONGC 
v. Saw Pipes,249 which remained the precedent on many 
occasions.250  In that case, the arbitral tribunal ordered 
liquidated damages, as agreed in the contract, in favor of the 
Respondent, which the Court found erroneous for being 
violative of the express provisions of the Indian Contract Act 
of 1872 concerning liquidated damages.251  Consequently, 
according to the SCI, the arbitral award suffered from patent 
error of law, and was therefore liable to be set aside for 
contravening the public policy of India.252  Explaining that 
the domestic award could be annulled if it was opposed to 
(a) fundamental policy of Indian law, (b) the interest of 
India, (c) justice or morality, or (d) if it is patently illegal, 
 
245 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34(2)(b)(ii).  
246 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34(2)(b)(ii). 
247 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34(3). 
248 Cent. Inland Water Transp. Corp. v. Brojonath Ganguly., (1986) 3 SCC 156 
¶ 95 (India). 
249 ONGC v. Saw Pipes, (2003) 5 SCC 705 (India). 
250 Hindustan Zinc Ltd v. Friends Coal Carbonisation, (2006) 4 SCC 445 
(India); see also Shipping Corp. of India v. Mare Shipping Inc., (2011) 8 SCC 
39 ¶ 25 (India) (reasoning "it was indicated therein that if the Award passed by 
the Arbitral Tribunal was contrary to any of the provisions of the Act or the 
substantive law governing the parties or was against the terms of the contract, 
the same could be set aside.") 
251 ONGC v. Saw Pipes, (2003) 5 SCC 705 (India). 
252 ONGC v. Saw Pipes, (2003) 5 SCC 705 (India). 
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the SCI thus added a new ground within public policy, i.e., 
patent illegality, while clarifying that the illegality had to go 
to the root of the matter and not be of trivial nature.253  The 
Court justified the inclusion on the ground that an award that 
patently infringed provisions of substantive law would 
“adversely affect the administration of justice” and therefore 
invariably be contrary to the public interest.254  The Delhi 
High Court in NPCC v. Rajdhani Builders clarified that an 
arbitral award would be patently illegal if it were contrary to 
(a) substantive provisions of law, (b) provisions of the 
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, or (c) the terms of the 
contract.255  In Associate Builders v. DDA, the Supreme 
Court held patent illegality to include: (i) a contravention of 
the substantive law of India, such contravention being patent 
and substantive as to be violating Section 28(1)(a); (ii) a 
violation of the 1996 Act; or (iii) ignoring the terms of the 
contract or failing to take into account usages of trade 
applicable to the transaction in contravention of Section 
28(3).256 
Following the 2015 Act, patent illegality, as a 
ground for setting aside an award, received statutory force in 
Section 34(2A).257  The Supreme Court in Ssangyong 
 
253 ONGC v. Saw Pipes, (2003) 5 SCC 705 (India). 
254 ONGC v. Saw Pipes, (2003) 5 SCC 705 (India). 
255 NPCC v. Rajdhani Builders, (2006) (2) ARBLR 219 (Delhi). 
256 Assoc. Builders v. Delhi Dev. Auth., 2014 (4) ARBLR 307 (SC) 31–34 
(India). 
257 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34.   
[Explanation 1.—For the avoidance of any doubt, it is 
clarified that an award is in conflict with the public 
policy of India, only if,—  
(i) the making of the award was induced or 
affected by fraud or corruption or was in 
violation of section 75 or section 81; or  
(ii) it is in contravention with the 
fundamental policy of Indian law; or  
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic 
notions of morality or justice. 
Explanation 2.—For the avoidance of doubt, the test as 
to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental 
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Engineering & Construction Ltd. v. National Highways 
Authority of India explained that the new criterion does not 
apply to the contravention of a statute not linked to public 
policy or public interest, which is not subsumed within the 
fundamental policy of Indian law.258  Affirming Ssangyong 
with regard to patent illegality, the SCI in Patel Engineering 
Ltd. v. North Eastern Electric Power Corp. explained that an 
arbitral award would be in contravention of point (iii) in 
Explanation One of Section 34(2)(b) if the Court finds the 
decision of the arbitrator to be “perverse, or, so irrational that 
no reasonable person would have arrived at the same; or, the 
construction of the contract is such that no fair or reasonable 
person would take; or, the view of the arbitrator is not even 
a possible view,” then the Court is required to set aside the 
reward as being patently illegal.259  This subhead of patent 
illegality, which is to be read together with point (iii), would 
be in addition to point (ii).260 
The award-creditor, per Section 9, is entitled to file 
an application for interim measures to protect or conserve 
the subject matter of the award, as such measures envisaged 
are intended to prevent an arbitral claim from being 
frustrated.261  Applications for such relief in the case of pre-
 
policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the 
merits of the dispute.]  
[(2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other 
than international commercial arbitrations, may also be 
set aside by the Court if the Court finds that the award is 
vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the 
award: 
Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on 
the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by 
reappreciating evidence.] 
The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §34.   
258 Ssangyong Eng’g and Constr. Ltd. v. Nat’l Highways Auth. of India, AIR 
2019 SC 5041 (India). 
259 Patel Eng’g Ltd. v. N. E. Elec. Power Corp., Order dated May 22, 2020 in 
Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 3584-85 of 2020 (India). 
260 See generally Patel Eng’g Ltd. v. N. E. Elec. Power Corp., Order dated May 
22, 2020 in Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 3584-85 of 2020 (India). 
261 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §9.  
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enforcement of an arbitral award are intended to protect the 
value of the proceedings until the eventual enforcement of 
the arbitral award.  In Dirk India Private Ltd,262 the Bombay 
High Court noted that the enforcement of an award accrues 
to the benefit of the party who has secured an award in the 
arbitral proceedings and observed that the enforceability of 
an award under Section 36, therefore, has to take note of the 
relative presence of these two time frames.263  It, therefore, 
held contextually “the scheme of Section 9 postulates an 
application for the grant of an interim measure of protection 
after the making of an arbitral award and before it is enforced 
for the benefit of the party which seeks enforcement of the 
award.”264 
DECIDING APPLICATIONS FOR STAY ON 
ENFORCEMENT – WAY FORWARD 
Given that the HCC dictum removed the “automatic 
stay” upon enforcement of an arbitral award as per Section 
36 of the 1996 Act,265 courts now retain discretion to order 
stay on enforcement pending disposal of an application for 
challenge, provided the award-debtor has applied for such 
relief of stay on enforcement.266  Subsection 3 specifies that 
courts may, for reasons recorded, order a stay of 
enforcement pending disposal of an application for setting 
aside the arbitral award while imposing such conditions as it 
may deem fit.267  Subsection 4 specifies that the courts take 
note of the provisions related to money decrees within the 
1908 CPC,268 whilst ordering such stay on enforcement of 
 
262 Dirk India Priv. Ltd v. Maharashtra State Elec. Generation Co., 2013 (7) 
Bom CR 493 (Bombay). 
263 Dirk India Priv. Ltd v. Maharashtra State Elec. Generation Co., 2013 (7) 
Bom CR 493 (Bombay). 
264 Dirk India Priv. Ltd v. Maharashtra State Elec. Generation Co., 2013 (7) 
Bom CR 493 (Bombay). 
265 As per the 2015 Act.  The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 
2015. 
266 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36.  
267 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36(3). 
268 The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Ord. 21, Rule 1.  
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an arbitral award for payment of money.  Section 36, as 
applied in HCC, is now aligned with the pro-arbitration 
approach enunciated in the UNCITRAL Model Law.269  
That said, there is little guidance with regard to the 
interpretation of the provisions related to exercise of 
discretion as per Section 36(2) and concerning the 
imposition of conditions for grant of stay as per Section 
36(3).270  The authors would like to suggest that Indian 
courts could gain useful insights from the development of 
law in other jurisdictions; they suggest a few such instances 
that offer interesting comprehensions on state practice in this 
regard.  
In L v. B,271 the Hong Kong Court of First Instance 
granted a stay on the enforcement of the award pending set-
aside proceedings.  Though the dispute arose in a foreign-
seated arbitration and proceedings were initiated in relation 
to declaration of the award’s nullity, the Court took 
jurisdiction over the applications—one by the applicant 
seeking security for enforcement, and the other by the 
respondent seeking stay of enforcement of the award 
pending disposal of the challenge to the award at the seat (the 
Bahamas).272  The Court took note of the following legal 
principles: 
• Strength of the argument that the 
award is invalid—if the award is 
manifestly invalid, there should be an 
adjournment and no order for security, 
whereas if it is manifestly valid, there 
should either be an order for 
immediate enforcement or else an 
order for substantial security; and 
 
269 Holtzmann & Neuhaus, supra, note 106.  
270 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, §36(2) & (3). 
271 L v. B, [2016], HCCT 41/2015, (C.F.I.).   
272 L v. B, HCCT 41/2015. 
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• Ease or difficulty of enforcement of 
the award—consideration of whether 
enforcement of the award will be 
rendered more difficult if enforcement 
is delayed.273 
The Court noted the nature of the set aside challenge 
presented by the Respondent in the curial jurisdiction to be 
of a minor irregularity, and therefore ordered a four-month 
stay of the enforcement proceedings on condition that the 
Respondent deposited the requested security within twenty-
one days.274  The Applicant’s costs of the application for 
security were granted on an indemnity basis.275 
For reasons of comity and on an assessment of 
managing unwarranted delays in enforcement of awards 
through ordering security for such enforcement, an English 
court in AIC Ltd. v. Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria 
decided to adjourn the enforcement of an award in England 
and order security pending the outcome of a set-aside 
application before a foreign court.276  An award rendered in 
Nigeria, and the subject matter of judicial proceedings 
therein, was sought to be enforced in England.277  Against 
the claimant’s application for enforcement, the defendant 
applied for adjournment of the proceedings pending decision 
in the Nigerian proceedings.278  Section 103(5) of the 
English Arbitration Act of 1996 gives the English court the 
power to adjourn a decision on enforcement if an application 
 
273 L v. B, HCCT 41/2015. 
274 L v. B, HCCT 41/2015.  
275 L v. B, HCCT 41/2015.  
276 AIC Ltd. v. Fed. Airports Authority of Nigeria [2019] EWHC 2212; see 
Melanie Martin, English Court Adjourns Enforcement of Nigerian 





277 AIC Ltd. v. Fed. Airports Authority of Nigeria [2019] EWHC 2212. 
278 AIC Ltd. v. Fed. Airports Authority of Nigeria [2019] EWHC 2212. 
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to set aside or suspend an award has been made in the 
country of arbitration.279  In such circumstances, the court 
also has the power to make it a condition of the adjournment 
that security is provided.280  Weighing the possibility of the 
defendant’s successful pursuit in having the arbitral award 
declared a nullity and the need to ensure protection against 
deterioration in its prospects of enforcement in England, and 
the award together with interest was a large sum of money 
for it to be deprived of, the court ordered the adjournment to 
be conditional on the defendant providing security of $24 
million which represented 50% of the award or 
approximately three years’ worth of interest on the award.281  
The decision articulated an important methodology for 
courts to adopt in identifying the factors to consider when 
exercising discretion with regard to deciding applications 
related to stay and adjournment.282  These factors hold 
valuable guidance that Indian courts could benefit from in 
deciding competing applications for stay and enforcement, 
so that courts may ensure the integrity of the arbitral process 
not be at risk: 
• Acknowledgement of the expansive 
discretion with regard to 
adjournment applications;  
• Assess the legitimacy of the set-
aside application, insulate against 
dilatory tactics; 
• Assessment of the possibility of the 
set-aside application being 
successful determined on a "sliding 
scale" whether the facts suggested 
 
279 AIC Ltd. v. Fed. Airports Authority of Nigeria [2019] EWHC 2212; see 
Arbitration Act 1996 (UK). 
280 AIC Ltd. v. Fed. Airports Authority of Nigeria [2019] EWHC 2212. 
281 AIC Ltd. v. Fed. Airports Authority of Nigeria [2019] EWHC 2212. 
282 AIC Ltd. v. Fed. Airports Authority of Nigeria [2019] EWHC 2212.   
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a "manifestly invalid" or 
"manifestly valid" award; 
• The stronger the merits of the 
foreign proceedings, the stronger 
the case for an adjournment and the 
weaker the case for security (and 
vice versa); 
• The possible prejudicial impact of 
the stay on the party seeking 
enforcement; and 
• Such assessment related to 
prejudice should make a 
comparative assessment of the 
position of the enforcing party were 
the enforcement allowed to proceed 
as against the position if the 
enforcement was delayed, the 
quantum of the security reflecting 
the degree of prejudice.283 
In conclusion, courts in India could draw 
inspiration from the jurisprudence on Article VI, NYC 
wherein it has been stated that a court of a contracting 
state “may, if it considers it proper, adjourn” 
proceedings and “may also . . . order the other party to 
give suitable security.”284  In light of the “permissive 
language” of Article VI, courts have full discretion to 
 
283 AIC Ltd. v. Fed. Airports Authority of Nigeria [2019] EWHC 2212. 
284 U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT GUIDE ON 
THE CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
ARBITRAL AWARDS, at 263, U.N. Sales No. E.16.V.7 (1958); see Emmanuel 
Gaillard & Benjamin Siino, The Guide to Challenging and Enforcing 
Arbitration Awards: Enforcement Under the New York Convention, GLOBAL 
ARB. REV. 1, 86 (2019) 
https://res.cloudinary.com/fieldfisher/image/upload/v1574347192/PDF-
Files/PDFs%20from%20old%20website/6-due-process-and-procedural-
irregularities-challenges_azwhjh.pdf; Rena Rico, Searching for Standards: 
Suspension of Enforcement Proceedings under Article VI of the New York 
Convention, 1 ASIAN INT’L ARB. J. 69, 77 (2005). 
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adjourn enforcement proceedings or order the defendant to 
provide security.285  As noted by the Supreme Court of Hong 
Kong,286 use of the term “may” indicates that the application 
for adjournment is a matter of discretion.  Noting the stated 
purposes of the 1996 Act and the subsequent law reform 
ushering more commitment to the same, Indian courts 
should contribute to that commitment as well by exercising 
the discretion related to ordering stay on enforcement of 
awards while cautiously ensuring that they would not unduly 
interfere with the arbitral process.287  They have much 
inspiration from other jurisdictions in that regard.   
 
 
285 U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., supra note 284. 
286 Hebei Import & Export Corp v. Polytek Eng’g Co., [1996] 3 H.K.C 725; see 
also Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, 156 F. 3d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
287 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 
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